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THIS CONFERENCE meets thirteen months after the adoption of the
Directives on the Fifth Five-Year Plan by the Nineteenth Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and in the middle of
the time span covered by the Plan (1951-1955) .Severalcommen-
taries on this and attendant documents have already appeared in
Western literature.2 It is indicative of the paucity of our information
that we must inquire at the outset whether the plan isstill an
operational order to those who manage the Soviet economy. The
stroke of fate which carried away Stalin's life early in March 1953
has reverberated to upset established balances within the Soviet
polity, and to reshape the course of history on both sides of the
Iron Curtain. It is inconceivable that this shock could have left the
rigid structure of Soviet plans, annual and quinquennial, without
need of substantial repair and overhaul. It is therefore safer to
view the Directives not as a blueprint of the impending develop-
ment of the Soviet economy through 1955, but as a clue to the
Soviet government's estimate, in mid-1952, of the possibilities of
development in the then desired direction. The word "clue" is used
advisedly, for the published document is only a brief summary of
the Five-Year Plan (FYP). Considering the authorship of the docu-
ment and the circumstances under which it was issued, we should
The author acknowledges gratefully the support and assistance extended by
the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, to this study. Thanks are
also due D. B. Shinikin for many valuable comments.
1 The text of the Directives and of the report on it by M. Z. Saburov (the
then chairman of the Gosplan) appear inPravda, October 12 and 10, 1952,
respectively. English translations in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, January
10, 1953, pp. 3-10, and December 6, 1952, pp. 3-8. References to the Fifth
Five-Year Plan will be hereafter cited by part and section, thus: Directives i, .
2Among those in English see: "Moscow Has a Plan," Twentieth Century,
November 1952; Economic Survey of Europe since the War, Geneva, United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1953, Chap. Iv; "The Kremlin's
Plan V," Fortune, February 1953, pp. 113 if.; Maurice Dobb, "Rates of Growth
under the Five-Year Plans," Soviet Studies, April 1953, pp. 364-386; and Peter
Wiles, "The Soviet Economy Outpaces Ours," Foreign Affairs, July 1953,pp.
568-580.
2 See the Postscript to this paper.
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not assume that it necessarily represents an accurate and faithful
summary of the complete Plan.
A third area of doubt is the "realism" of the Plan, or at least of
those portions which have been revealed to us. The attainment of the
targets for 1955 is predicated on great increases in the productivity
of labor and equipment in industry and construction, and of labor
and land in agriculture. For instance, labor productivity in industry
is to rise by 50 per cent between 1950 and 1955, though this is not
inconsistent with the claimed rise of 18 per cent through 1952.
While bearing in mind the large program for irrigation and meliora-
tion, we may be even more skeptical of the projected increases in
the per hectare yields of agricultural crops: about 50 per cent for
grains, potatoes, and sunflower seed, and about 25 per cent for
cotton, sugar beet, and flax.5 Since the crop targets are fully de-
pendent on these yields, the opinion that of all portions of the Plan
"the agricultural production program is the least likely to ma-
terialize" seems reasonable.6
With these doubts in mind, I shall discuss the implications of the
Plan with respect to capital formation, emphasizing especially the
trend toward much greater capital-intensity of investment. Some
explanations of this trend will be offered as tentative hypotheses.
2. Manpower and Investment in the Fifth Five-Year Plan
One of the most interesting figures in the Fifth FYP is the
projected increase of only 15 per cent in the number of workers
and employees, or roughly speaking, in the non-agricultural labor
force.7 This amounts to an average annual increase of 2.8 per cent
(Table 1). For industry8 alone, the projected rate of growth in em-
ployment is apparently even lower, and can be estimated on the
basis of output and productivity targets to be 13 per cent, or 2.5
per cent per year. Contrast the rates of growth of employment in the
Fifth FYP with the actual record of the first two Plans taken to-
Directives, concluding part, and Pravda, January 29, 1952 and January 23,
1953.
5 See Economic Survei of Europe since the War, as cited, Table 19, p. 45,
which is based on the Directives and other Soviet sources. In the case of grain
the yield in 1952 was no higher than in 1950.
6 "Moscow Has a Plan," as cited, p. 389.
Directives iv, 1. The term "workers and employees" in Soviet usage includes
a few million employed in agriculture (at state farms and machine tractor
stations), but excludes nearly the same number of handicraftsmen;italso
presumably excludes forced labor in camps.
8 For the definition of industry see note a to Table 1.
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TABLE 1
Workers and Employees in the U.S.S.R.,
Selected Years, 1928-1955
INDUSThY5
YEAR TOTAL Total Workers Only
Yearly Average
(rnillion.s)
1928 11.6 3.87b 3.36c
1932 22.9 8.Od 5.76c
1937 27.0 10.le 8.05e
1940 31.2 10.9 8.38g
1941annual plan (82.4)11 (11.4)1 (8.81)'
1942 plan (82.0)e (11.8)e (9.2)e
1945 27.3 n.e. n.e.
1948 31.0 9.91 7.6i
1947 32.2 10.71 8.21
1948 34.2 11.81 9.11
1949 36.0 12.61 9.61
1950 plan (33.5)k (11.9)1 (9.1)1
1950 38.2 13.81 10.61
1951 39.8 14.71 11.21
1952 40.7 15.11 11.6J




(1st and 2nd FYP's) 9.8 11.2 n.e.
1937-1942 plan
(3rd FYP) 3.5 3.2 2.6
1987-1940 5.0" 2.6" 1.8"
1945-1950




a BySoviet definition includesmanufacturing, mining, electric power genera-
tion, forestry, and fishing.
bTrudv S.S.S.R. (Labor in the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, Tsentral'noe upravienie
narodnokhoziaistvennogo ucheta (TsUNKhU) Gosplan S.S.S.R. (Central Ad-
ministration forEconomic Accounting, Gosplan, U.S.S.R.), 1936,p. 11. Indi-
cated figure is the sum of figures for large-scale and small-scale industry, forestry,
and fishing, and is presumably comparable with data for subsequent years.
Estimated by applying ratio of workers to all personnel in large-scale in-
dustry to employment in all industry (Trud v S.S.S.R., as cited,p. 11 and
Table 23, p. 93). The 1928 figure includes apprentices; hence rate of growth
from 1928 to 1937 not computed.
d Sotsialistiöheskoe stroitel'stvo Soiuza S.S.R. (Socialist Construction of the
U.S.S.R.), Moscow-Leningrad, 1989, p. 188.
Tretii piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Soiuza S.S.R. (Third
(cont. on next page)
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TABLE 1 (cont.)
FYI'forthe Development of the Economy of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, Gosudar-
stvennaia planovaia komissiia (State Planning Commission), 1939. 'Industryaccounted for 35 per cent of all workers and employees in 1940.
N. Voznesensky, Voennaia ekonomika S.S.S.R. v period Otechestvennoi voiny
(The War Economy of the U.S.S.R. during the Patriotic War), Moscow, 1948,
p. 109.
g Computed from employment, output, and productivity data in the 1941 Plan.
Gosudarstvennyi plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva S.S.S.R. na 1941 god (State
Plan for the Development of the Economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1941), reprinted
by the American Council of Learned Societies, pp. 3, 512, and 513, and ad-
justed as under note h.
"Adjusted by Eason (see the Source) for consistency with published revision
of 1940 figure.
iGosudarstvennyi plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva S.S.S.R. na 1941 god,
as cited, p. 512. Adjusted by the present author as in note h. The figure for
"workers only" obtained by applying the same ratio of workers to total personnel
in industry as indicated for a somewhat smaller coverage in the Source.
i Computed on the basis of scattered statements on changes in industrial
output and labor productivity, ultimately linked to the 1940 figure. Productivity
changes presumably refer to workers only. Total employment in industry
arbitrarily assumed to move proportionately with the number of workers.
k Zakon o piatiletnem plan vosstanovleniia i razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva
S.S.S.R. na 1946-1950 gg. (Law on the FYI' for the Reconstruction and De-
velopment of the Economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1946-1950), sec. in,2.
Directives iv, 1.
Computed from year preceding inauguration of FYP to last year of Plan.
"Not adjusted for intervening changes in territory and length of work-week.
n.e. =noestimate.
Source: Warren W. Eason, "Population and Labor Force," in Soviet Economic
Growth, Abram Bergson, editor, Row, Peterson, 1953, Table 3.3, p.110,
except as indicated by footnotes. Eason's figures are from official Soviet sources,
adjusted to an annual average basis from 1945 on.
gether: 9.8 per cent per year for the whole economy and 11.2 per
cent yearly for industry.0 The Fifth FYP rates are unprecedentedly
low except in relation to those of the Third FYP as originally pro-
jected and those actually achieved from 1937 to 1940, at least in
the case of industry. But this latter comparison must be interpreted
with caution because of the specific events which occurred in the
1937-1940 period: the territorial expansion during 1939 and 1940,
the rapid conversion to munitions production during those years, and
Were the First FYP taken alone, the rates would have been even higher,
but it is combined with the Second FYP because the huge inflow of labor
into non-agricultural employment between 1928 and 1932 was not really
assiniiliated and absorbed until the following quinquennium, while recruitment
for non-agricultural employment during the Second FYP was accordingly lower
because of this "internal" reserve of manpower. Similiarly, the increase in non-
agricultural employment during the Fourth FYP was probably considerably
affected in its earlier years by demobilization. Therefore, an alternative calcula-
tion covering the later years 1947-1951 is presented in Table 1.
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the extension of working hours by some 17 per cent in mid-1940.
However, the similarity between the planned growth over 1937-1942
and that over 1950-1955 is of some significance, especially since it
extends beyond mere employment data.
The slowness of the increase in non-agricultural employment dur-
ing the Fifth FYP, relative to past peacetime experience, cannot
be explained by a compensating lengthening of the work-week, for
no such provision appears in the Directives, nor is a lengthening
likely, considering that the forty-eight-hour week is still in effect.1°
The question is doubly challenging because the slow rise in non-
agricultural employment is to be associated with an unprecedentedly
large volume of investment. Evidently, each recruit to emjloyment
outside of agriculture will be accompanied by much more new
capital than during previous peacetime periods, or even than was
planned for the unrealized Third FYP. Unfortunately, although the
general picture is fairly clear, it is difficult to give faithful quantita-
tive expression to this phenomenon, not only because of the usual
conceptual and theoretical obstacles to the "physical" measurement
of investment, but also (and especially) because of the scarcity and
unreliability of Soviet data. Hence the cryptic official statements on
the volume of investment will have to be supplemented by several
indirect real indicators of capital formation.
The Fifth FYP explicitly calls for an increase of 90 per cent in
the volume of gross fixed capital investment by the state over the
five years, as compared with the preceding quinquennium, and an
increase of 110 per cent in agriculture alone.h1 Since it is unlikely that
in the Fourth FYP agriculture received more than a fifth of all fixed
investment,12 and an even smaller fraction of fixed investment by
thestate,presuthably the increase in fixed investment outside of
agriculture for the Fifth FYP period, over the preceding period, has
been planned at just 'under 90 per cent. This seems to check with
a scheduled doubling of (gross) investment in industry alone,13
and with these planned outputs of investment goods in 1955, ex-
pressed as ratios of the respective outputs in 1950: cement, 2.2;
bricks, 2.3; slate, 2.6; all building materials, "not under" 2.0; out-
put of the machine-building and metal-working industries (proba-
10 That is, barring the outbreak of war, in which case the Plan as revealed
would be scrapped anyway.
11 Directives, concluding part and ii, 12.
12 Cf. Norman M. Kaplan, "Capital Formation and Allocation," in Soviet
Economic Growth, Abram Bergson, editor, Row, Peterson, 1953, Table 2.7, p. 52.
18 DIrectives x, 3.
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bly including munitions), 2.0; large metal-cutting tools, 2.6; equip-
ment for iron and steel mills, 1.85; and chemical equipment, 3.3. A
corollary of these figures is that by 1955 the rate of gross investment
(in all forms) out of the gross national product will probably be
substantially higher than it was in 1950, when it had already reached,
by our very crude estimate, about 25 per cent (factor cost basis,
adjusted a la Bergson) 14
Atthe same time, the absolute increase in the number of workers
and employees during the Fifth FYP is to be only slightly more than
one-half that during the Fourth Plan period, and an even smaller
fraction for industry alone.15 Thus if the investment data are to be
taken seriously and the employment targets are not understated,
the (gross) "incremental" capital-intensity in the non-agricultural
sector—defined as the volume of (gross) fixed capital investment
divided by the increment in the number of workers and employees—
is to be nearly four times as high during the current Plan as in the
Fourth FYP period. For industry alone, the incremental capital-
intensity seems to increase even more in the present period. It is
likely that adjustment to a net investment basis, which is not at-
tempted here, would not greatly alter the picture. The relative
quality, or relative potential productivity, of an average "unit" of
fixed investment in the two quinquennia should of course also be
considered. It is not clear to what extent the Soviet index takes
account of this element, if at all. The likelihood that an average
"unit" of investment increases in its potential productivity over time
thanks to the progress of technology in general, and Soviet tech-
nology in particular, must be—at least in some part—balanced against
the probability of diminishing returns to capital and the depletion
of some natural resources.
But comparisons with the Fourth Plan period, so greatly domi-
nated by reconstruction, are perhaps of limited significance for a
longer-run view of Soviet capital formation. Consequently, an at-
tempt has been made to construct indicators of the capital-intensity
of Soviet investment by selected periods over the whole span of
time since the beginning of the Plan Era—that is, for 1928-1955. The
calculations and results appear in Table 2. Aggregative ruble figures
would have been of very questionable use for this purpose. Un-
Cf. Abram Bergson, Soviet National Income and Pfoduct in 1937, Columbia
University Press, 1953.
Underlying data in Table 1; the exact fraction for industry is not known
for lack of an employment estimate for 1945.
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fortunately, physical indicators of investment common to all the
periods are very scarce. Indeed, the only two series which seem to
be more or less usable for the purpose are employed in the table,
namely: (1) the consumption of cement 'during the whole period
in question, and (2) the absolute increase in electric power output
(or, alternatively, electric power consumption in industry) between
the year preceding the period in question and the terminal year
of the period. The rationale, of the procedure is that cement con-
sumption is highly correlated with total construction, which in turn
is highly correlated with the "physical volume" of investment. (For
the Third and Fifth FYP periods estimates of planned cement
output are substituted for consumption, but the distortion is proba-
bly slight.) Furthermore, since the bulk of Soviet power output is
consumed by producers, rather than by ultimate consumers, and
since at least the share taken by industry is quite stable, the incre-
ment in electric power output can be taken as a measure of the
increase in power available to the non-agricultural labor force 'over
the period. Analogously, the increase in power consumption by
industry is taken as an indicator of the power available to workers
employed in industry.
On the surface it would seem that each of these two indicators
contains an upward bias. The great jump in cement consumption in
the current quinquennium is undoubtedly connected with' the
large "cement-intensive" projects of the first half of the 1950's—
dams, canals, and probably airfields. In addition, housing and road
construction may demand an unusually large amount of cement in
the present period. The rate of growth of power output also probably
exceeds the rate of growth of physical capital due to the trend
toward greater electrification of' production in general, and the
rapid growth of electricity-using industries (e.g. aluminum). On the
other hand, it is likely that, with time, cement tends to be "ëom-
bined" with more productive equipment, and electric power is used
to run more productive machinery (in the sense of more final goods
produced by it per kilowatt-hour consumed), so that the upward
bias just mentioned may be offset to an unknown degree. Note that
while all gross fixed investment is supposed to increase 1.9-fold
during the Fifth Plan as compared with the Fourth Plan period,
cement consumption (output) is to rise 2.6-fold, and the increment
in power output is to rise 1.8-fold.10
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TABLE 2 (cont.)
aOutputminus exports.
b Output; figures for 1938 through 1941 obtained by straight-line inter-
polation.
Output; 1953 and 1954 figures obtained by straight-line interpolation.
d Employment for years after 1940 multiplied by 1.17.
eBydefinition Soviet industry includes manufacturing, mining, electric power
generation, forestry, and fishing.
n.e. =noestimate.
Note: All increases are differences between figures for last year of given
period and last year of preceding period.
Source: For cement and power: Narodnoe khoziaistvo S.S.S.R., Statisticheskii
spravochnik (The Economy of the U.S.S.R.,Stati.stical Manual), Moscow,
TsUNKhU S.S.S.R.,1932, p.xxxiv;Sotsiali.rticheskoe stroitel'stvoS.S.S.R.
(Socialist Construction of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, TsUNKhU S.S.S.R., l936,pp.
19, 22, and 183; Tretii piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziai.rtva Soiuza
S.S.R. (Third FYP for the Development of the Economy of the U.S.S.R.), Mos-
cow, Gosudarstvennaia planovala komissiia (State Planning Commission), 1939,
pp. 202 and 205; Demitri B. Shimkin, Minerals—A Key to Soviet Power, Harvard
University Press, 1953, Tables 95 and 100; Economic Survey of Europe in
1951, Geneva, United Nations Economic Commission far Europe, 1952, Table
58; and Economic Survey of Europe since the War, Geneva, United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, 1953, Table 17. For power consumption by
industry: Table 4. For employment: Table 1.
These series are divided by the increase in the total number of
workers and employees in the whole economy to obtain indicators of
incremental capital-intensity in the non-agricultural sector. How-
ever, since the concept of capital-intensity as here used refers in some
sense to the combination of the factor "labor" with the factor "capi-
tal," a further adjustment is necessary to allow for the lengthening
of the work-week by the decree of June 26, 1940. The adjustment
factor, applicable only to columns 3 to 5, is 1.17. Other variations in
the work-week are disregarded, and it is also assumed that the
Third FYP did not contemplate any change in this respect.
The ratios in question are shown in lines 8, 9, and 10 of Table
2. As has been suspected, the figures for the Fourth Plan period
turn out to be unrepresentative of the trend and fall much below it,
reflecting both the rapid expansion of non-agricultural employment
and the setback during the war. But the years 1948-1951 already
show a marked turn toward the late prewar situation, as exemplified
by the unrealized Third FYP. The upward trend is resumed in the
current Plan. Lines 8 and 9 suggest that each additional worker or
employee is to be accompanied (with adjustment for working hours)
during the Fifth FYP period by five to six times as great a volume
of investment in fixed capital as was true during the first two Plan
periods. Obviously, this is only a very rough and tentative indication
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of the rise in the incremental capital-intensity incidental to Soviet
economic growth, though the fact of a very marked rise is hardly
to be doubted. As may be expected, capital-intensity in industry
alone, as suggested by increments in power consumption in in-
dustry (line 10), shows an even steeper rise from 1929-1937 to
1950-1955.
3. Growth of the Capital Stock, 1928-1955
The effect of a rising incremental capital-intensity in the Soviet
economy is, of course, to increase with time the ratio of the stock
of fixed capital to the amount of labor working with it. Again, satis-
factory data are lacking, but some rather indirect evidence of this
process may be obtained from the computations presented in Tables
3 and 4, where the consumption of power is used as a rough mdi-
TABLE 3
Estimated Supply of Mineral and Hydroelectric Energy, Selected Years,
U.S.S.R., 1928-1955
(per cent; 1928 = 100)
Per Worker or Em-






1928 100 100 100 100
1932 184 n.e. 93 93
1937 352 322 151 151
1940 442 • 348 164 152
1942 plan 650b n.e. 23Gb 236"
1946
•
407C n.e. 152c n.e.
1950 672 510 204 173
1955 plan 998" 700" 264b 224b
a 1940 multiplied by .925; 1950 and 1955 multiplied by .85. No adjustment
made for 1946, as the statutory work-week was probably significantly exceeded
in that year.
b Based on planned output of energy, rather than on consumption.
Hydroelectric power omitted in both numerator and denominator for lack
of data for 1946; indexes probably slightly understated thereby.
n.e.no estimate.
Source: Appendix Table.
cator of the capital stock on hand. Table 3 shows in index form the
total energy available to the Soviet economy from mineral fuels
and hydroelectric power in selected years from 1928 through 1955,
figures for the latter year being planned targets. The underlying data
were obtained chiefly from Shimkin's estimates of mineral consump-
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tion, converted to conventional coal units as indicated in my Ap-
pendix Table. It must be noted that not all sources of energy are
comprised in the index. Fuelwood and horses (as well as other
animals)are notable omissions;'7 consequently, the indicesin
Table 3 exaggerate somewhat the increase in the energy available
to the Soviet economy. On the other hand, the omissions may be
justified on the ground that our interest in energy is chiefly in its
capacity as an indicator of the capital stock assisting the "workers
and employees" in production. In this respect the relative importance
of fuelwood and animal power is, and has been, probably quite
small. Since the personnel of the machine-tractor stations and of the
state farms, the "energy-using" parts of agriculture, are subsumed
under the category of workers and employees, this category con-
tains virtually all the labor force engaged in lines of activity with
a substantial use of power, with the significant exception of the
military.
The results of rapid economic development, as well as the set-
•backs caused by the war, are vividly reflected in the table. By 1950
the index of total energy consumption reached 672 (1928100):
and on a per capita basis, 510. However, the intervening influx of
labor into "worker and employee" status has been large and the work-
week lengthened somewhat, so that the annual amount of energy
consumed per worker or employee only doubled, and rose by only
73 per cent on a man-hour basis. Moreover, the levels of energy con-
sumption planned for 1942, whether per capita (insofar as they can
be inferred), or per worker or employee, or per man-hour, which
were implicit in the Third FYP, were reached in 1950, although total
energy consumption was slightly higher. In the case of the supply
of energy per man-hour the deficiency is quite large—173 versus
236. Significantly, even by 1955 the supply of energy per man-hour
will not yet quite attain the level planned for 1942, if our calcula-
tions are without major error.
How faithfully do ,the data in Table 3 represent the "true" growth
of the stock of fixed capital of the Soviet economy? Will the capital.
stock in 1955 (if the Plan is realized), in some meaningful sense, be
in fact ten times as large as in 1928? These questions must be left
open. It is curious, though, to note the close agreement between the 'In1937 these two sources accounted for 11.7 and 2.9 per cent, respectively,
of total energy production in the Soviet Union. Chauricev D. Harris, "Indus-
trial Resources," in Soviet Economic Growth, as. cited, Table 5.2, p. 169.
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series in column 1 and the data given by Voznesenskiil8_namely,
that the value of fixd capital of the "socialist enterprises" of the
U.S.S.R., exclusive of the value of livestock, rose as follows:
Billions of Index Numbers





For years after 1928, these index numbers are uniformly 10 to
12 per cent above the indexes of total energy supply in Table 3. If
Voznesenskii's coverage were extended to include enterprises of all
kinds as well as the value of livestock, this gap would probably
vanish, and possibly even turn into a difference in the other direction.
Unfortunately, his figures are of unknown reliability, and of course
do not refer to any year more recent than 1940.
Last, Table 4 presents estimates of electric power consumption
per worker in Soviet industry, with a rough correction to a man-hour
basis. As may be expected, the series rise much more rapidly than
those in Table 3, and, for reasons already intimated, they probably
greatly exaggerate the growth of the volume of fixed capital in
Soviet industry. For instance, total consumption of electric power in
industry rose nineteenfold between 1928 and 1950, though it does
not seem plausible that the capital stock of industry increased in a
comparable ratio. But whatever the precise magnitudes involved,
there is a clear suggestion in Table 4 of a rapid rise in total capital,
and capital per worker, in Soviet industry.'
4. Factors behind Capital-Intensity
The preceding sections have attempted to show that the "incre-
mental" capital-intensity, at least in the non-agricultural sector, is
planned to be unprecedentedly high in the current FYP; and that at
18N.Voznesensky, Voennaia ekonomika S.S.S.R. v period otechestvennoi
voiny (The War Economy of the U.S.S.R. during the Patriotic War), Moscow,
1948, p. 12.
Contrast the data on electric power use by Soviet industry (Table 4) with
the following information on the number of electric motors and their capacity
"at work" in Soviet agriculture in 1950: inallagriculture, "over" 75,000
motors, 400,000 kilowatts (Elektrlchestvo, No. 11, 1952, p. 9); on collective
farms, "over" 36,000 motors, 215,000 kilowatts (ibid., No. 10, 1950, p. 8).
In that year there were 254,000 collective farms before their amalgamation into
97,000 larger units, and the labor force in all agriculture was probably over
40 million.
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TABLE 4
Electric Power Consumption per Worker in Soviet Industry,
Selected Years, 1928-1955
Electric POwerNumber of Power Power per
Consumed byWorkers in per WorkerWorker, Adjusted
Industry" Industrya (kw-h) for Lengthening
(billions of kw-h)(millions) (1) --(2) of Work-week
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1928 8.38 3.8Gb 1,00Gb 1,00Gb •
1932 8.88 5.76 1,540 1,540
1937 25.1 8.05 3,120 3,120
1940 33.4 8.38 4,000 3,690











1955plan 124.6 12.0 10,840 8,790
a Industryincludes manufacturing, mining, electric power generation, forestry,
and fishing.
bNumberof workers indicated for 1928 includes apprentices; thus power per
worker is correspondingly understated for this year by an unknown amount,
probably in the order of 10 per cent.
Column
1For 1928 and 1932, Sots. stroi., 1936, p. 28; for 1937 and 1942, Tretli
piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Soiuza S.S.R. (Third FYP
for the Development of the Economy of theU.S.S.R.), Moscow,
Gosudarstvennaia planovaia komissiia(State Planning Commission),
1939, p. 43; for 1940, power consumed by industry assumed to have
been the same percentage (69) of total power output as in 1937, and
total output (48.3 billion, kilowatt-hours) from Economic Survey of
Europe since the War, Geneva, United Nations, Economic Commission
for Europe, 1953, Table 17; for 1950 and 1952, total output from ibid.,
share consumed by industry taken for both years as five-sevenths, as
given in Elektrichestvo, No. 10, 1952, p. 93; and for 1955, product
of columns 2 and 3.
2From Table 1.
8For 1955, consumption in industry per worker is planned to be 1.7
times the 1950 figure, from M. Z. Saburov in Pravda, October 12 and
10, 1952, English translations in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
January 10, 1953 and December 6, 1952.
41940 multiplied by .925; subsequent years multiplied by .85. Note that
the increase in power consumption per worker (Column 3) from 1940
to 1955 plan checks very closely with Saburov's assertion of a planned
2.6-fold increase (bc. cit.); 4,000 X 2.610,400.
the end of the period, in 1955, the average Soviet worker (or worker-
employee) will presumably have the benefit of a considerably larger
amount of productive capital than ever before in Russian experi-
ence, as indicated by the projected consumption of electric power
in industry and of mineral energy in the whole economy. This de-
velopment is due not only to the large and rapidly grpwing volume
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of investment, but also (at least in part) to the retardation in the
growth of the non-agricultural labor force in general, and of in-
dustrial employment in particular. In fact, it is very likely that the
whole increase in the category of workers and employees is to be
drawn from the natural increase in the population, and that the
agricultural population is planned to remain virtually unchanged in
number during the quinquennium. If so, this is apparently a new
phase in Soviet planning, approximated in the past only by the
provisions of the Third FYP.
To facilitate treatment, it may be postulated, probably with little
violence to Soviet reality, that the decision on the share of the na-
tional product to be allocated to investment over a prospective plan-
fling period is most fundamental and has priority over all but a few
of the other major planning decisions. It may be further assumed that
the posited production targets in the two major sectors, agriculture,
and outside of agriculture, can be achieved by a series of alternative
combinations of labor and capital. An isoquant may be visualized for
each of the two major sectors, with labor and capital along the two
coordinates of the plane. The constraints are (1) the total amount of
capital for use in both sectors (equal to the stock at the beginning
of the period plus additions to it from current investment), and (2)
the total labor for distribution between the two sectors. Thus
choice of a position on one of the isoquants (say; the combination
of capital and labor with which the non-agricultural output target
is to be produced) uniquely determines the position on the other
isoquant. Moreover, the same decision obviously also determines the
capital-intensity, "incremental" and "average," in each sector. This
is the highly schematized conceptual framework within which the
subsequent discussion will proceed.
Although the distribution of investment and that of labor between
the sectors of the economy are in this view mutually determined and
of equal significance, the remainder of this article will discuss chiefly
the problems of labor transfer within the Soviet economy, since these
are probably more complex and more intractable than those of the
allocation of investment funds between sectors. In particular, the
possible reasons for the retardation in the growth of the non-agri-
cultural labor force will be explored. They will be distinguished
according to whether they tend to detain (or even retain) labor in
uses other than non-agricultural employment—hereafter referred to
as the detentive factors—or to deter labor from being advanta-
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geously absorbed in non-agricultural employment—hereafter called
the deterrent factors.
5. Detentive Factors
The detentive factors are (1) the high goals and composition of
the present labor supply in the agricultural sector, (2) the effects of
the educational goals, (3) the expected reduction in the proportion
of women in the labor force, and (4) the maintenance of the strength
of the armed forces.
AGRICULTURE
The ambitious nature of the agricultural part of the Fifth FYP
has already been noted. It is apparently planned that the gross out-
put of agriculture will rise by something like 50 per cent over the
quinquennium, based on very large expected increases in yields per
hectare and per animal, and labor productivity in agriculture is ac-
cordingly scheduled to rise by 40 per cent. Although there may be
serious doubt whether these goals can be attained and therefore
whether the consumption targets of the plan are realistic, the
regime's concern over the fulfillment of the latter may have militated
against any substantial reduction in the agricultural population over
these five years. It must be remembered that, under present cir-
cumstances, even a stable agricultural population implies an im-
provement in the labor supply in this sector. First, at present there
is an exceedingly high ratio of women to men in agricultural work
and especially among those actually performing field tasks. This
is a result of male losses in past wars, military service, transfer to
non-agricultural employment, and detention in forced labor camps.
While some of these causes will presurriably' continue to withdraw
men from agricultural employment, distortions from other causes,
especially war losses, are likely to be gradually rectified with time,
thus leading to a slow improvement in the "quality" of agricultural
labor. Second, the large age-group born during the second half of
the 1930's, between the demographic disasters of collectivization and
those of World War II, will be reaching working age in the middle
1950's, thus raising the ratio of workers to dependents. But both of
these factors will probably have only a limited effect within the time
span of the current Plan, i.e. through 1955.
The extent to which manpower needs in Soviet agriculture at the
present time retard the growth of the rest of the economy depends in
part on the possibility of replacing labor by capital in this sector. The'
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very low labor productivity in Soviet collective and state farms, as
compared with productivity in American farming, for example, also
suggests an extremely low marginal productivity, and therefore ample
possibility for such replacement in the long run. Thus on examining
the ratio of tractors to total arable area in the U.S.S.R. and other
countries Dobb thinks that "there does not seem to be much sign
of an early limit being reached to labor-saving improvement in agri-
culture" in the former, though he adds that "it is possible, however,
that some slackening in the proportional (as distinct from the abso-
lute) growth of the industrial labor-force may have to be allowed
for inside the present decade" on this score.2° He might also have
pointed, in this connection, to the remaining vast potential for rural
electrification.21 But other careful students would probably attribute
the low productivity largely to the specific organizational forms of
Soviet agriculture, which tend to be wasteful of human and material
resources and injurious to incentives,22 and would therefore pre-
sumably be skeptical of the possibilities of releasing much agricul-
tural labor through further mechanization.
The whole problem of the transfer of underemployed manpower
from agriculture into other sectors of the economy is, of course,
not independent of the costs of retraining, moving, and urbanization,
as well as the actual opportunities for the substitution of labor for
capital in non-agricultural employment. This is an extremely complex
economic calculation even for a Gosplan; outside observers can do
no more than raise questions.
Before leaving the. consideration of agriculture as a detentive
factor, it should be noted that the regime may have other than
strictly economic reasons for not reducing the size of the rural
population, such as maintenance of the birth rate, political (and
police) control, etc.
EDUCATION
By 1955, enrollment in full-time educational institutions may cut
appreciably into the labor force, and may be responsible in con-
siderable measure for the retardation in non-agricultural employ-
ment: Most important here is the projected expansion in attendance
in the last three grades of secondary education, the so-called grades
eight to ten, corresponding roughly to .the ages fourteen-fifteen to
20 op.cit., p. 372. 21See footnote 19.
22 Cf. Naum Jasny, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1949, esp. Chaps. xvii and xviii.
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sixteen-seventeen. It is planned to extend education through the
tenth grade to all children in the more important cities and towns,
and to increase enrollment in the upper grades elsewhere as well.
This is to increase total enrollment in the last three grades by 1955
to 4-fold the number in urban centers, and to 4.5-fold in rural areas,
as compared with 1950.23 The absolute numbers involved are not
known, but on the basis of prewar school statistics and postwar data
on total enrollment the planned increa.se of the number attending
the three grades may be about 5 to 7 million.24 In addition, enroll-
ment in secondary technical schools and in institutions of higher
learning is apparently scheduled to rise, judging by references to
future graduations. Perhaps an increase of several hundred thousand
may be anticipated on this account.
However, some of these increases may be at the expense of
enrollment in the labor reserve schools for industrial training, and,
of course, not all of the pupils and students in question would be
in the non-agricultural labor force if not in school. Thus the net
impact on employment is likely to be smaller than the above figures
suggest, but still probably in the millions. This impact is greatest
during the initial years, while the "stock" of pupils and students is
being built up. In later years graduations and releases will pre-
sumably catch up with admissions, except for the normal growth
in the school population, and the retarding effect of this factor will
disappear.
HOUSEKEEPING
A very gradual drop in the proportion of women in the non-
agricultural labor force may be expected in the foreseeable future.
This proportion (related to the total number of workers and em-
ployees in the economy) rose during the 1930's to 40 per cent just
before the war, then jumped for obvious reasons to 53 per cent in
1942, and fell only to 47 per cent in 1947. Since then there has
been a slight reduction to 45.7 per cent for 1950; later postwar data
are apparently not available.25
The expectation of a further reduction in the proportion of women
23 Directiver iv, 5, and Saburov, op. cit., iv.
24 In 1952 alone, it is claimed, enrollment in grades eight to ten increased by
1 million pupils, as compared with 1951. Pravda, January 23, 1953.
25 All figures are taken from Warren W. Eason, "Population and Labor
Force," in Soviet Economic Growth, as cited, Table 3.3, p. 110; they were
obtained by him from Soviet sources. There may have been a temporary rise
in the proportion in 1948, immediately after the currency reform.
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in the non-agricultural labor force rests on a priori grounds. The
most important of these is the continuous improvement in real wages
and consumption standards, which may be expected to reduce the
pressure for housewives to seek active employment. A gradual re-
turn of the sex ratio among adults to a more normal level is likely
to have the same effect, though probably on a smaller scale.
MILITARY SERVICE
An important rival to non-agricultural employment with respect
to manpower and the most uncertain and indefinite element from
the point of view of an outside analyst is, of course, military service.
But two factors point to at least a maintenance of the armed forces
in a constant ratio to the total population through the current
quinquennium. First, the new military classes in the middle 1950's
will be larger than at the beginning of that decade, for the reason
already mentioned. Second, the Fifth FYP. seems to imply an
pansion of the military effort26 and may, therefore, divert at least
the same amount of manpower to this use.
6. Deterrent Factors
The deterrent factors which tend to keep labor from being ad-
vantageously absorbed in non-agricultural employment are (1) the
initial cost of transferring workers to urban communities, (2) the
goal of maintaining or increasing consumption standards, (3) con-
siderations of military strategy, and (4) the technological bias in-
herent in Soviet ideology. Working within the non-agricultural sector,
these factors militate for a lesser use of labor in production, and
therefore call for a higher capital-intensity in this sector in order
to achieve the desired output. The non-agricultural sector is under-
stood here in a broad sense, including, but not limited to, the urban
economy in general. In fact most of the problems discussed under
this rubric arise out of the costs and hazards of urbanization, rather
than out of the characteristics of the production processes as such.
COST OF URBANIZATION
'It seems quite possible that the initial cost of "urbanizing" workers
and their families causes Soviet planners to minimize the transfer of
manpower from agricultural employment to industrial and other
26Considerthe increases in the output of aluminum, petroleum products,
and other products of military significance. Cf "The Kremlin's Plan V," as cited.
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urban pufsuits, and therefore to press for the substitution of capital
for labor in the non-agricultural sector.
A major handicap to further industrialization seems to be the
severe shortage of urban housing. In the earlier phase of its economic
development the Soviet Union had been able to draw on the urban
capital (chiefly housing) which it inherited from the past to an ex-
tent that was probably not fully appreciated by contemporary ob-
servers. Thus, while the urban population increased from 26.3 mil-
lion at the end of 1926 to 55.9 million at the beginning of 1939, or by
112 per cent, the available urban dwelling space rose only by about
50 per cent. As a result, the urban space per capita fell from 6
square meters to just over 4 square meters, on the average. Some
housing slack was acquired with the territorial annexations of 1939-
1940, though it was inconveniently localized. Then came the war
losses. However, by 1950 not only were these apparently made good
(at least in quantity if not in quality) but enough additional space
was built to keep pace with the growth of the urban population.
Thus approximately the same amount as before the war, 4 square
meters per capita, seems to have been available at the beginning of
the Fifth FYP.2' With this figure as an average, the situation must
be considerably worse for large parts of the urban population. The
regime is, by all indications, seriously concerned with the housing
shortage and is making an unusually determined effort to alleviate
it. But whether the current Plan in fact provides for a substantial
housing improvement is not clear, for theconclusion depends on one's
interpretation f the construction provisions of the Plan, and on one's
estimate of the growth of the urban population to 1955.28
27Thespace estimates are by Timothy Sosnovy, prepared for his forthcom-
ing book, The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union, and here used with the
author's kind permission. The Soviet concept of dwelling space(zhilaia
ploshchad') excludes secondary space such as hallways, kitchens, lavatories, and
closets.
28ThePlan calls for 105 million square meters to be placed in use by the
state, and an undetermined, but undoubtedly much smaller, amount by in-
dividuals (Directives iv, 3). However, there is evidence to the effect that the
measure of space was redefined in 1948, resulting in an inflation of new
construction figures. (I owe this observation to Carolyn Recht of the Russian
Research Center, Harvard University, who is making a careful study of Soviet
housing.) The actual increase in urban dwelling space may altogether be
under 30 per cent,ifthe Plan materializes fully. Compare this with the
scheduled increase of 15 per cent in the number of workers and eniployees,
with probably an appreciable increase in the number of dependents (students,
housewives, etc.) per gainfully employed person, as discussed in the preceding
section. Hence the impression that the Plan envisages only a modest improve-
ment in per capita urban housing space at best.
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At any rate, it seems quite safe to assume that the regime rules
out a further deterioration of the severe housing situation, even if
greater overcrowding under peacetime conditions were thinkable.
The resource has been depleted. Presumably, new migrants to the
cities and towns have to be supplied with at least the existing average
housing ration. This space must be newly constructed, with a cor-
responding claim on the state's investment resources. But capital
needs do not stop here. If the already low standards of urban con-
veniences and necessities are not to be further diluted, additional
capital has to be concomitantly investeclin such facilities as streets,
urban transportation, some public utilities, schools, retail outlets,
and so forth. Moreover, the transfer of a given "primary" number of
persons to cities or towns requires the transfer of others to service the
primary migrants, and still others to service the second group, and
so forth in a convergent series. The "secondary" migrants—that is,
all those who "follow" the primary—will be engaged in such occupa-
tions as retail trade, urban and interurban transportation, municipal
services and administration, and education. Finally, if all these peo-
ple are to be recruited chiefly from among the peasants, a capital out-
lay by the state is also necessary at the outset to train them in their
new functions and to underwrite their low productivity. Very likely
also some investment is necessary in agriculture to compensate for
the withdrawal of manpower from that sector.
The investment i' by the economy—that is, by the state—occasioned
by the movement of an additional person to an urban location can
be expressed as follows:
i'[(h+f)(1+d) +t+al(1+s)
where h—capitalcost of housing per person
capital cost of other urban facilities per person
dnumber of dependents per gainfully employed
tcostof retraining a migrant, and similar expenses
acompensating capital investment in agriculture per work-
er withdrawn
snumberof "secondary" migrants per "primary" migrant.
It must be noted that in the industrialization of typical capitalist
countries the capital requirement to the potential employer of raw
labor did not, and does not, amount to the full extent designated by
i'. True, the private employer may undertake the cost of training or
retraining, and not infrequently may find it necessary or expedient
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to invest in housing for his personnel, and sometimes even in cer-
tain other facilities of an urban character. But he will rarely be con-
cerned with providing the same for the "secondary" labor force,
and will never be required to furnish capital to the agricultural sec-
tor in order to compensate for his recruitment of manpower. To the
planners of the all-embracing Soviet state, all these are, or should
be, costs of equal concern; moreover, there is reason to believe that
the planners in fact do take such considerations into account.
But there is another quantity of capital, i", which, if invested in
labor-saving equipment in the non-agricultural sector, would com-
pletely dispense with the transfer of the worker from the village into
the city. In an optimal situation it is the marginal rate of substitution
between capital and labor along the isoquants standing for total non-
agricultural output. But under actual conditions, and especially
with the Soviet distinction between "leading" and other branches
of the economy, the value of i" may be expected to vary widely from
one branch to another. If i" is lower than i' in any particular line
of activity, there is patently an economic case for choosing a more
labor-saving, i.e. a more capital-intensive, method of producing a
given output. Certain preliminary calculations made by Carolyn
Recht of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, point
to a strong likelihood that in at least some instances this is the case
at the present time in the Soviet economy. Unfortunately, the perti-
nent quantitative information is scarce, and the whole question is
further clouded by uncertainty as to how meaningful Soviet account-
ing prices are.29
Considerations of this sort have apparently figured in the recent
thinking of Soviet planners and economists. On the operational
side much of the present expansion in the non-agricultural sector,
especially in industry, seems to be taking place through the release
of manpower from established production units to expanded or
newly created ones, thanks to the replacement of labor by capital
in the former. Malenkov specifically brought up this point in his
report to the Nineteenth Party Congress.'°
Theoretically, his question was treated in the context of optimum
allocation of investment funds by P. Mstislavskii.' True, these
29 Miss Recht's calculations were made for her doctoral dissertation on Soviet
housing problems, in progress, and are here mentioned with her kind permis-
sion. This whole section owes much to her comments.
30 Pravda, October 6, 1952, and Current Digest of the Soviet Press, November
8, 1952, p. 5.
31 "Nekotorye voprosy effektivnosti kapitalovlozhenii v sovetskom khoziaistve"
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sources do not discuss the relative magnitudes of i' and i", in our
symbols, but the preference for the more capital-intensive solution
as against a greater influx of manpower from agriculture is perhaps
implicit.
In this connection, the efforts of the Soviet Union to mechanize
"labor-intensive" processes, and further to automatize production,
must be noted. After the initial postwar reconstruction job was
largely completed, a vigorous campaign was launched to mechanize
the labor-intensive processes in industry, construction, and other
branches outside of agriculture. These traditional areas of very low
labor productivity in the Soviet economy—e.g. handling of materials,
warehousing, inspection, and many construction jobs—are now being
mechanized, or in some instances rationalized in other ways, such
as through the introduction of statistical quality controL32
Automation, a much more ambitious undertaking than the mech-.
anization of labor-intensive processes, is also by all evidence re-
ceiving very serious attention. The Soviet interest in automatics
and allied problems dates back at least to 1934, when a Committee
(later Institute) on Automatics and Remote Control (Telemekhanika)
was established at the Academy of Sciences. The journal Avtomatika
i Telemekhanika has appeared since 1936. The Third FYP and the
resolutions of the Eighteenth Party Congress (1939) gave political
significance to the development of automatics, but apparently very
little was done before the war. Since the war the subject has been
seriously pursued, and it is very prominent in the Directives for the
Fifth FYP. Some results have already been accomplished, notably
in hydroelectric generation (a minor, field for labor-saving) and
a few machining operations. But the scope of true automation so
far attained is probably small, and the results likely to accrue by
1955 cannot be determined without an intensive examination of the
("Certain Questions of the Effectiveness of Capital Investment in the Soviet
Economy"), Voprosy ekonomiki (Problems of Economics), No. 6, 1949, pp.
96-115; condensed English translation in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
March 4, 1950, pp. 12-19. Mstislavskii's contribution pertained to the quarter-
century-old, and as yet unresolved, Soviet controversy on the theory and
practice of choice of investment variant to achieve a desired fixed output, and
the related problem of the place of interest in Soviet economic calculations.
See my "Scarce Capital and Soviet Doctrine," Quarterly Journal of Economici,
August 1953, pp. 311-343, and the bibliographical references therein.
32 This is not the place to appraise the success of the campaign up to now.
Undoubtedly, some advance has been registered in the last five or six years.
What I should like to stress is the direction and earnestness of the planners'
thinking.
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available literature, which is not attempted here. It is quite likely
that the successes to date have been chiefly of an experimental
and pilot nature, so far of little impact on labor requirements.
Nevertheless, the direction of thought and the intensity of interest
must be noted. With time, this field may affect considerably the
character of Soviet industrialization and may conceivably upset the
still rather close relationship between industrialization and urban-
ization.33
A corollary of the emphasis on capital-intensive (i.e. labor-saving)
modes of production, to which the cost of urbanization under pres-
ent Soviet conditions may be contributing, is a more rapid rise in
the productivity of labor, especially in industry. This is not to say
that rising labor productivity is not a target per Se, independent of
the pressure of urbanization costs, but it must also be seen in the
broader context of the allocation of the economy's investment re-
sources between "overhead" and "production" capital. For this rea-
son, as well as for many others, some of the recent appraisals of
the prospects of labor productivity in the Soviet Union may turn out
to be unduly negative.54
SUPPLY OF CONSUMERS' GOODS
The burden of maintaining desired consumption standards, or
desired rates in their improvement, may also cause Soviet planners
to hold down the transfer of agricultural manpower to non-agricul-
tural, especially urban, employment. The consumption levels of the
non-agricultural population (excluding, of course, inmates of con-
centration camps) are probably at this point (1953) appreciably
higher than those of the peasants. This is probably particularly true
of the per capita purchases of manufactured consumers' goods. What
is more, the gap between the two has been, by all indications, stead-
ily widening over the last few years, and will probably continue to
widen, considering the doubt as to the attainability of the agricul-
tural goals of the Fifth FYP. Given the gap, the smaller the move-
In this connection, I found stimulating an unpublished paper by Richard
L. Meier of the University of Chicag9, entitled "Automatism in the Early
Stages of Economic Development" (February 1953). Meier sees the advent
of automation in industry as ushering in new opportunities for industrialization
in hitherto backward areas with a minimum of social dislocation and with
large savings in investment in social overhead capital. Much of his thinking
isrelevant to the Soviet situation. Cf. John T. Diebold, Automation, Van
Nostrand, 1952, passim.
E.g. Irving H. Siegel, "Labor Productivity in the Soviet Union," Journal
of the American Statistical Association, March 1953, pp. 74 if.
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ment out of agriculture into other employment, the more consump-
tion standards can be raised in each sector, other things being
equal. This may correspond to the political aims of the regime,
and thus may argue against a rapid increase in the category of
workers and employees.
CONSIDERATIONS OF MILITARY STRATEGY
The hazard of aerial bombing in the event of war reinforces the
other considerations against rapid urban agglomeration, and per-
haps lends an aspect of imperativeness to them. But if industrializa-
tion goals are not to be sacrificed while the size of the urban
population is held down, additional capital equipment, often ex-
pensive and complex, must replace labor. This makes the physical
plant a more rewarding target to the attacker, and renders repair
more difficult and more protracted in case of damage. It is hard
to say where the balance is struck in the minds of Soviet planners.
However, labor-saving variants of production processes, and espe-
cially automatic processes, also have the advantage that they are
less likely to be disrupted by a withdrawal of manpower during
a mobilization. This holds especially true, of course, for industries
of strategic importance, the "leading" branches of the economy and
of industry in Soviet parlance. The preferenci enjoyed by these
industries in the U.S.S.R. in terms of allocation of capital, modern
equipment, skilled labor, etc., is perhaps understandable for this
reason. Although in general the economic effect would be greatest
if capital were so allocated as to• equalize its marginal productivity
of the factor in all uses, in the "leading" as well as in the other
branches, actual Soviet practice becomes more rational than may
seem the case at first glance if a correction factor, representing the
probability of the particular enterprise not being operated at all
in the event of war, is introduced into the calculation. Whether
Soviet planners reason in these terms or not, their practice seems to
produce such an effect.
TECHNOLOGICAL BIAS
The several deterrent factors discussed above militate against
the transfer of manpower from agriculture into industrial and urban
employment, with the implication that the productivity of labor in
industry and other branches (except agriculture) must be raised by
means of a greater capital-intensity of production to the levels re-
quired to achieve the desired outputs. But high labor productivity
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and its concomitant, advanced technical design, may be desirable
in themselves or as manifestations of the technological and political
achievements of the regime. Technological supremacy and high
labor productivity have been an integral part of the ideology of
Soviet communism since Lenin's day and have been continuously
regarded as prime political goals. Moreover, individual achievements
in the technical field, or even mere intentions of achievement, have
been adroitly used for whipping up enthusiasm at home and earn-
ing good will abroad. Despite the condemnation of "gigantomania"
in the late 1930's, there his constantly been a preference for the
grandiose project and for the most advanced technical design, some-
times at excessive economic cost. Even on more modest levels eco-
nomic calculation often yields to technological criteria, at least in
the "leading" branches and leading" enterprises (which are fortunate
enough to be allotted the necessary means ). Isit not possible, there-
fore, that the combination of a low rate of absorption of labor
into non-agricultural employment, and especially into industry, with
the large volume of investment in this sector is viewed with favor
because it harmonizes with the technological bias of the Soviet
regime, quite apart from strictly economic calculations?
7. Concluding Remarks
I shall not try to divine the relative importane of the several
factors, detentive and deterrent, enumerated in the last two sections.
The list is undoubtedly incomplete anyway. But there is no doubt
that one of the outstanding features of the Fifth FYI' is a sinificànt
retardation in the rate of growth of non-agricultural employment.
In this respect it is reminiscent of the Third FYP (see Table 1),
which, of course, was never fully realized. There are other interest-
ing similarities between the two Plans: in projected rates of growth
of the output of all industry and of many individual commodities,
in the relationship between the planned increases in the output of
producers' goods and of consumers' goods, in the growth of agricul-
tural output and of railroad traffic, and in rates of increase in labor
productivity.36
Good reasons can be found for these similarities. In the fall of
1952 as well as in the spring of 1939—the times of adoption of the
Plans—the U.S.S.R. found itself in an uneasy peace. Military needs
Cf. "Scarce Capital and Soviet Doctrine," as cited.
36 The two Plans are conveniently compared in Economic Survey of Europe
since the War, as cited, pp. 39 and 41.
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claimed much of the national product at both times (although he
size and character of the military establishment were considerably
different in 1952 from what, they were in 1939). Each Plan was
adopted six to seven years after the passing of a major disaster and
after a feverish period of construction or reconstruction, marked by
an unforeseeably large expansion of the non-agricultural labor force.
The task of assimilating and absorbing this labor faced each of the
two Plans (though the Second FYP had already done some of this
for the Third). Urban consumption levels were, I believe, approxi-
mately the same in 1952 and in 1939; so was urban housing space—
about 4 square meters per person. But the peasants were probably
worse off in the later period. Finally, the rates of investment out of
the national product were about the same at the start of each Plan;
whatever advantage now accrues to the Soviet economy from a
larger total product is largely offset by the heavier military burden
and by the larger number of mouths to feed. But the similarity should
not be pressed too far, for the absolute goals of the Fifth Plan are
much larger than those of the Third FYP, the volume of investment
much greater, the industrial base much broader, and the levels of
technological skill higher. The figures in Tables 2 through 4 reflect
some of these differences.
At the present time there is not only unprecedentedly high average
capital-intensity (for the U.S.S.R.), but also extreme unevenness
in technological advance and in labor productivity. Within certain
limited areas of the "leading" branches of the Soviet economy, labor
productivity is probably quite comparable with, and sometimes pos-
sibly even exceeds, the accepted levels in the United States, thanks
to modern equipment, mass production, incentive pay, sufficient
training, and pressure from all the agencies of the state. Moreover,
in these limited areas Soviet technologists and scientists are un-
doubtedly pushing against the frontiers of knowledge, with the aid
of Western achievements, largely available to them, and of their
own not inconsiderable talents. It would be wrong in my estimation,
however, to view these areas as typical of the Soviet economy, how-
ever much Soviet propaganda would so desire. Walter Galenson's
computations of productivity relative to American levels show a
wide difference between individual industries, with machine-build-
ing and iron-and-steel industries yielding the highest, and consumers'
goods industries the lowest, ratios.37 These computations pertain to
"Industrial Labor Productivity," in Soviet Economic Growth, as cited, pp.
202 if., esp. Table 6.8.
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the late 1930's. If an analogous investigation were possible for the
present, Soviet industries would probably show a similarly wide
range of labor productivities relative to the American.38 Moreover,
smaller organizational units—individual shops or operations—would
exhibit an even greater variation ui the relative levels of labor
productivity. Greater contrasts than those within Soviet industry can
hardly be found, and, for that matter, the same is true for contrasts
between industry and agriculture in the U.S.S.R.
The regime is well aware of this general picture,39 and, like any
inefficiency, low labor productivity presents a challenge and a po-
tential for improvement—the inefficient group "hiding" a "reserve" in
Soviet parlance. Moreover, this reserve has a considerable advantage
over a pooi of underemployed manpower in agriculture inasmuch
as it is already within the urban environment, is presumably pro-
vided with housing and other facilities at the existing norms, and
has been exposed to techniques. It is made up mainly of workers
who are now being supplied with additional capital equipment and
are gradually being reshuffled over the non-agricultural sector.
However, the consequences of a high planned incremental capital-
intensity are not limited to a beneficial effect on labor productivity.
Other problems arise simultaneously, such as the creation of a spec-
trum of skills required by the higher level of mechanization, and
an appropriate replacement policy for equipment. To date, the
prevalent attitude of Soviet Writers (though less of engineers than
of economists) has been to deny the existence of an obsolescence
problem in the Soviet economy. The position has been dogmatic, but
perhaps not without some merit under conditions of extreme shortage
of equipment in relation to the demands of the Plans. However, if
the stress is now about to shift to modernization, in order to permit
the release of labor with low productivity to man the new produc-
tion lines, a more flexible attitude on replacement will undoubtedly
be required. It will be interesting to watch the Soviet response and,
especially, its theoretical underpinnings.
The discussion so far has assumed that both the volume of invest-
ment and the desired bill of goods for the prospective period are
given, and has revolved essentially around the question of the
optimum capital-intensity (ratio of capital to labor) in each sector,
38 Ibid., pp. 207-210.
Cf. Malenkov's complaint of the low productivity in certain areas of in-
dustry at the Nineteenth Party Congress. Pravda, October 6, 1952, and Current
Digestofthe Soviet Press, November 8, 1952.
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i.e. of the best allocation and distribution of the available investment
resources and labor over the economy. It has been suggested that
problems of labor transfer are more difficult and complex than those
of the distribution of investment funds, and the possible reasons
behind the provisions of the Fifth FYP has been therefore treated
primarily from the side of labor allocation. However, the available
volume of investment resources and the production targets are of
course not independent postulates for planning, but are mutually
defined in their broader outlines. Thus it is quite possible that the
retardation in the expansion of non-agricultural employment, and
the rising capital needs required to assist the transfer of manpower
and to replace labor, might explain the small but perceptible re-
tardation in the rate of growth of industrial output indicated by the
Fifth Five-Year Plan. The average yearly rate for all industry called
for by the Plan is 12 per cent. The rates already realized within this
period are, by Soviet claim:
Period Per Cent Increase
1950-1951 16
1951-1952 11
1952-1953 (first halves) 10
Compare these rates with past rates as recomputed by Hodgman:°





(The rate of growth during 1946-1950 was, of course, favorably af-
fected by the reconstruction character of most of the period.)
Other reasons for the slowing down of industrial expansion can
be adduced, and Dobb in his analysis of this question does not as-
sign causal significance to the small increase in non-agricultural
employment.
Furthermore, the element of rationality in Soyiet economic de-
velopment should not be overstressed. Not all the major decisions are
40D.R. Hodgman, "Industrial Production," in Soviet Economic Growth, as
cited, p. 242. Hodgman's index is essentially one of large-scale industry; exten
sion to all industry would somewhat lower his figures. The official claims of
industrial growth have of course been very much higher and are generally
considered by American students to be inflated. However, the new Soviet index,
in effect apparently since 1950, may contain little upward bias, if any (cf.
Alexander Gerschenkron, "Reliability of Soviet Industrial and National Income
Statistics," The American Statistician, April-May 1953, p. 19).
41Op.cit., pp. 378 if.
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the result of "'tifisocial engineering"; ideological constraints
and technological biases play their part. To put it another way, not
everything is calculated with paper and pencil in hand. To a large
extent the Fifth Five-Year Plan is probably a resultant of numerous
autonomous forces, a compromise between several political factions
and scores of bureaucratic leviathans within the body of the regime.
These forces have a dynamic of their own, and a full understanding
of the Plan requires the knowledge of this dynamic, which is un-
fortunately denied the outside observer.
Postscript
The preceding lines were written in July 1953. It is known now
(March 1955) that productivity in industry and construction has not
advanced at the pace foreseen in the Fifth FYP, though claims are
made that industrial production targets have been met on the whole.
Accordingly, the number of workers and employees by the end of
1954 already exceeded the goal for the end of 1955, and the urban
population is probably growing more rapidly than anticipated. These
developments must be seen in the context of the far-reaching meas-
ures, especially with regard to agriculture, that have been introduced
since Stalin's death.
As a result of these changes, the Fifth FYP—in the sense of a
definite and detailed document—may be pronounced dead, though
its demise has not been officially subscribed. The new measures are
too far-reaching not to affect significantly every major part of the
Plan for the remainder of. its life span. However, it would be easy
to overrate the deflection in the economic course which has taken
place since March 1953. There is no evidence that the larger trends
have already suffered significant reversal or change. The Soviet
Union is apparently continuing to invest at a very high rate in rela-
tion to its product and in very large absolute volume, to raise rapidly
the amount of capital supplied to each industrial worker, to press
for large technological gains, and to push up labor productivity
with all the means at its command. In these respects, as in most
others, the same range of means is employed as heretofore, and
the institutional structure has hardly been affected. More funda-
mentally, the potentials for development and the limitational factors
inherent in the Soviet economy must have outlived Stalin, and are
now guiding the thought and shaping the actions of his successors.
Hence, although this paper may now pertain to a historical rather
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APPENDIX TABLE (cont.)
a Regional hydraulic stations only, but exclusion of other hydraulic
stations not significant for these years.
b Exclusive of hydroelectric power.
Population figures are approximate estimates by the author.
0Numberof workers and employees as in Table 1.
e Rounded.
n.e. —noestimate.
Source: All fuel and power data in natural units are estimates, of con-
sumption, except the following, which are output data: all figures for
peat and hydroelectric power and all figures for 1942 (plan) and 1955
(plan). All consumption estimates are from Demitri B. Shinikin, Minerals
—A Key to Soviet Power, Harvard University Press, 1953, Table 100, p.
391. Output targets for 1942 are from Tretil piatiletnii plan razvitiia
narodnogo khoziaistva Soiuza S.S.R. (Third FYP for the Development of
the Economy of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, Gosudarstvennaia planovaia
komissiia (State Planning Commission), 1939, pp. 44 and 202. Con-
version of natural gas into cubic meters is from Shimkin, op. cit., p. 198.
Output targets for 1955 are from Economic Survey of Europe since the
War, Geneva, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1953,
Table 17, pp. 42-43, except that the 1955 target for natural gas was
obtained by applying ratio of increase in the Directives, i.e.1.8, to
Shimkin's estimate. Peat output: for 1928 and 1932 from Sots. stroi.,
1936, p.180; for 1987, 1940, 1946, 1950, and 1955 (plan) from
Economic Survey of Europe since the War, as cited, Table 17, pp. 42-43;
and for 1942 (plan) from Tretii piatiletnii plan ..., ascited, pp. 44 and
202. Hydroelectric power output: for 1928 and 1932 from Sots. stroi.,
1936, p. 90 (refers to regional stations only); for 1987 from Chauncey
D. Harris, "Industrial Resources," in Soviet Economic Growth, Abram
Bergson, editor, Row, Peterson, 1953, p. 169; for 1940, 1950, and 1955
(plan) from Economic Survey of Europe since the War, as cited, Table
18, p. 44; and for 1942 (plan) from Tretii piatiletnii plan ..., ascited,
pp. 44 and 202.
Conversion to conventional coal units: For coal and lignite through
1940 at 6,350 and 3,400 calories per kilogram, respectively, which are
the approximate rates implicit in Shimkin, op. cit., Tables 49 and 50,
pp. 176-177; for 1942 (plan) at 5,800 calories per kilogram for coal and
lignite together (cf. ibid.); and for 1950 and 1955 (plan) at 5,700
calories per kilogram for coal and lignite together (cf. ibid.). For other
sources of energy, rates as given by Harris, op. cit., Table 5.2, note j, p.
169, based chiefly on Soviet sources.
and evaluation of current problems of Soviet economic development
has not seriously suffered from the recent turn of events.
C 0 M M E N T
NORMAN M. KAPLAN, Rand Corporation'
Grossman has presented an able, thoughtful, and very interesting
analysis of the growth of the Soviet labor force. Observing an Un-
'I am indebted to my colleague Gershon Cooper for helpful discussions dur-
ing the preparation of these comments.
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precedentedily low rate of increase in the non-agricultural labor
force planned for 1951-1955, he states and explores a number of
hypotheses as possible explanations. Though this discussion is in-
conclusive, though the hypotheses are neither accepted nor rejected,
the paper brings forcibly to our attention possible perspectives in
Soviet economic development. Indeed, one or these—an unprece-
dented emphasis on the growth of agriculture—has, had rather
dramatic verification in recent months.
The intent of the paper, however, is more ambitious than the
achievements just described. The analysis of changes in the non-
agricultural labor force is part of a larger argument which, to put
it baldly, goes as follows: The basic empirical, observation is that
in the non-agricultural sector of the economy "incremental capital-
intensity," defined as the ratio of investment to the absolute increase
in the labor force, is planned to be unprecedentedly high in 1951-
1955. This increase in incremental capital-intensity is due to an
increase in investment and a decrease in the increment to the non-
agricultural labor force. If investment and labor increments are
regarded as substitutes in the process of economic growth, the de-
crease in the increment to the non-agricultural labor force is itself
an explanation of the increase in non-agricultural investment and
incremental capital-intensity. Furthermore, when the retardation in
the growth of the non-agricultural labor force is analyzed, the
labor-saving explanation for the increase in incremental capital-in-
tensity is reinforced by the discovery of factors which suggest a
desire or a necessity to substitute capital for labor in the non-agri-
cultural sector of the economy. Thus the conclusion seems to be
that non-agricultural incremental capital-intensity is unprecedent-
edly high because capital is being substituted for labor.
Because I have reservations about the relevance of the argument
to trends or policy in capital formation and because these reserva-
tions do not depreciate. the analysis of labor force changes, I wish
to discuss separately and in turn: (1) the trends in capital-intensity,
(2) the meaning of capital-intensity, and (3) the demand for, and
supply of, non-agricultural labor.
1, Trends in Capital-Intensity. The basic quantity which Gross-
man seeks to measure is the incremental capital-intensity, i.e. the
ratio of investment to the increment in the labor force, in the non-
agricultural sector of the economy. In the absence of investment data
at constant prices for the entire period of interest, two series are
used as indicators of investment: cement output (where possible,
202TRENDS INSOVIET CAPITAL FORMATION
less exports) and the absolute increase in electric power output. The
results of the calculation show a very large increase in the incre-
mental capital-intensity of the non-agricultural sector, especially for
the Fifth FYP (1951-1955). Depending upon which of the two series
is used as the investment indicator (see Grossman, Table 2), the





The rationale for the indicator series is that: (1) cement consump-
tion and new construction are correlated; (2) the absolute increase
in electric power output and that in producers' durables are cor-
related; and (8) new construction and investment are correlated,
as are producers' durables and investment.2 Except for a comparison
of the increase in investment, cement output, and the increment in
electric power output between 1946-1950 and plan 1951-1955, the
hypothesized relationships among the series are not tested. I have
attempted to show the comparison, with the limited data available,
in Table 1. Since the use which Grossman makes of the indicator
series requires not only that investment be correlated with cement
output or the increment in electric power output but that the per-
centage changes in the series be equal, Table 1 compares for various
time periods the percentage changes in investment with the per-
centage changes in cement output and the increment in electric
power output.8
The results provide small comfort. Within each of the time seg-
2have improvised somewhat on Grossman's statement of the rationale:
see Grossman, pages 176, 177 above.
3 There are a number of ambiguities in the postwar data which I have not
taken the space to discuss.
I have also looked into the relationships between cement output and new
construction and between the increment in electric power consumption and
producers' durables in the United States, with the following data and results
emerging:
a. For new construction I used the sum of private and public construction
in 1945-1949 prices (Construction and Building Materials, Statistical Supple-
ment, Dept. of Commerce, May 1953, pp. 40 and 42). For cement output I
used the Federal Reserve Board index of cement production. I compared the
two series for 1920 to 1929, 1935 to 1950, and 1946 to 1952 separately. For
each of the periods as a whole the percentage increase in cement output was
appreciably less than the percentage increase in new construction. Within each
of the periods cement output became a substantially better indicator of new
construction whenever the ratio of public to private investment increased
substantially.
b. The comparison between incremental electric power consumption and
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TABLE 1
Investment, Cement Output, and the Increment in Electric Power Output,
U.S.S.R., Selected Time Periods from 1933 to 1955



















1986 plan 168a 218" 243"
1987 plan 178" 278" 325"
1937 lOOb 100" b00
1942 plan 166b 178" 226'
1948 lOOd lOOe lOOe
1947 hod 189e 161
1948 135d 194e 198e
1949 162d 245e 261e
1949 hOOd lOOe bOOe
1950 128' 127e 103e
1951 188d 152" 106
1952 153d 174" 112"
1948-1950 1O0 l00 lOOf
1951-1955plan 190 263 177
1950 bOg 100" lOOh
1955 plan 160-180g 220" 117"
a Calculated from data in State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., The
Second Five Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the
USSR (1933-1937), London, Lawrence, pp. 560-561, 577, and 581. The invest-
ment data are in 1933 plan prices.
b Calculated from data in Tretii piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva
Soiuza S.S.R. (1938-1942 gg.), Moscow, Gosudarstvennaia planovaia komissiia,
1939, p. 26. The 1987 investment figure is in 1937 prices, and the 1942 plan
figure in December 1936 prices; consequently, the percentage change in in-
vestment is somewhat understated.
CThefigures for 1937 and 1942 plan electric power output are from Tretli
piatiletnii plan...,ascited, p. 213. The 1986 figure is from Narodno-
khoziaistvennyi plan Soiuza S.S.R. na 1937 god, Moscow, Cosudarstvennaia
planovaia komisssiia, 1937, pp. 64-65. The 1941 plan figure is obtained by
linear interpolation between the 1937 and 1942 plan figures. The percentages
are then calculated from the increments in electric power output.
d Annual investment for 1947 through 1950 is obtained from I. Kuz'minov,
"Nepreryvnyi pod'emnarodnogokhoziaistvaS.S.S.R.—zakonsotsializma,"
Voprosy ekonomiki, 1951, No. 8, p. 33. The 1951 and 1952 figures are from
Pravda, January 29, 1952, p. 2 and January 23, 1953, p. 2, respectively. Each
of these figures is stated as a percentage of the figure for the preceding year
and is in comparable prices. I have chained the percentages.
e Calculated from data in Economic Survey of Europe in 1951, Geneva,
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1952, pp. 127 and 128;
(cont. on next page)
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TABLE 1 (cont.)
Economic Survey of Europe since the War, Geneva, United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe, 1953, pp. 42 and 43; and Kuz'minov, op. cit., p. 30.
Grossman, pp. 178-180 above.
gIf1951-1955 plan investment is 190 per cent of 1948-1950 investment,
1955 plan investment is less than 190 per cent of 1950 investment because of
the very rapid increase in investment from the low of 1945 to 1950. On the
basis of 1951 and 1952 investment figures I would judge that 1955 plan invest-
ment is to be about 160 per cent of 1950 investment. To take account of pos-
sible underfufflilment of the 1951 and 1952 investment figures, I have set a
range with an upper limit of 180 per cent for the ratio between 1955 plan
investment and 1950 investment.
IiCalculatedfrom data in Economic Survey of Europe in 1951, as cited,
p. 127, and Economic Survey of Europe since the War, as cited, pp. 42 and
43. Electric power output for 1954 plan was obtained by linear interpolation
between the 1950 and 1955 plan figures.
ments examined, except for the most recent years, both cement out-
put and incremental electric power output increase by larger per-
centages than investment; in the years since 1949, cement output
leads, but incremental electric power output lags behind, invest-
ment in percentage increases. There may very well be relationships
over time between investment, on the one hand, and cement or
incremental electric power output, on the other, but the data seem
to deny equality in percentage increase over time. The hypothesized
relationships may be adequste to yield what Grossman requires—
namely, an indication of increasing incremental capital-intensity—but
as indicators in a more accurate sense they seem to fail.
Although incremental capital-intensity in conceived as a measure
of the additional capital available per additional worker, it is defined
in terms of gross investment and the difference between net and
producers' durables was made separately for two periods, 1923 to 1929 and
1947 to 1951. For the 1923-to-1929 period, I used Shaw's series on total
producers' durables in 1913 prices (William H. Shaw, Value of Commodity
Output since 1869, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1947, p. 77). For
the same period I used alternatively two electric power series: electric energy
used in manufacturing and extracting, and sales of power in kilowatt-hours by
electricutilitiestonon-residential consumers(HistoricalStatisticsof the
United States, 1789-1945, Bureau of the Census, 1949, pp. 157 and 159). For
the period from 1947 to 1951, only the second electric power series was
available to me (in the Statistical Abstract of the United States, Bureau of the
Census, for the relevant years). For the 1947-to-1951 period, I used producers'
durables in 1929 dollars from the CNP accounts. In both the 1923-to-1929 and
1947-to-1951 periods the percentage changes in incremental electric power Out-
put behaved in an extremely erratic fashion vis-h-vis the percentage changes in
producers' durables: for some years the percentage change in electric power
output was far below, and for other years far above, the percentage change in
producers' durables.
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gross investment in the numerator is ignored.5 In the Fifth FYP as
against prewar periods, I suspect the difference is appreciable. For
example, capital repairs as a percentage of total investment (in-
clusive of capital repairs) were 18 per cent in 1951 plan as against
13 per cent in the Plan for 1938-1942, 11 per cent in 1937, and less
than 10 per cent in 19331937.8 After twenty years of economic
growth and five years of war (1928-1953) the arithmetic aspects of
the matter suggest a ratio of capital consumption to gross investment
which is appreciably greater at the end of the period than in the early
years of the period.7 Accordingly, if the incremental capital-intensity
series are accurate as defined, I would suspect an overstatement of
the trend in additional capital per additional worker due to time
changes in the ratio of capital consumption to gross investment.
In addition to incremental capital-intensity, Grossman seeks to
measure trends in average non-agricultural capital-intensity,i.e.
the ratio of capital to labor in the non-agricultural sector of the
economy. In this calculation the total supply of mineral and hydro-
electric energy (in conventional coal units) is used as the indicator
of capital. The results of the calculation show a large increase in
average capital-intensity between 1928 and 1955 plan, interrupted
en route by declines between 1928 and 1932 and between 1940 and
1946; in 1955 plan, average capital-intensity, however, is to be less
than that foreseen for 1942 by the Third FYP (Grossman, Table 3).
For the prewar years the percentage increases in energy supply and
the percentage increases in capital at constant prices correspond very
closely; for the postwar years no capital series is available for
comparison.8
A statement that adjustment to net investment "would not greatly alter the
picture" apparently refers to the comparison between 1951-1955 plan and
1946-1950 capital-intensities only.
6 For the underlying data see A. Zverev, "Biudzhet mirnogo khoziaistvennogo
i kultur'nogo stroitel'stva," Planovoe khoziaistovo, 1952, No. 1, pp. 29 and 80;
Tretii piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziai.stva Soiuza S.S.R. (1938-1942
gg.), Moscow, Gosudarstvennaia planovaia komissiia, 1939, pp. 26, 115, 116,
and 225; Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo Soiuza S.S.R. (1933-1938 gg.), Moscow-
Leningrad, Tsentral'noe upravienie narodnokhoziaistvennogo ucheta, 1939, pp.
113 and 115; and E. Granovskii and B. Markus, Ekonomika sotsiali.sticheskoe
promyshlennosti, Moscow, 1940, p. 533.
See Evsey Domar, "Depreciation, Replacement and Growth," Economic
Journal, March 1953, pp. 1 if., for an analysis of the relationships between
capital consumption and gross investment and for illustrative calculations (p.
3) of the ratio of depreciation to gross investment as a function of time, the
rate of increase of gross investment, and the average life span of capital.
8 See Grossman, pages 180-182, where the correspondence between per-
centage increases in total capital and in energy supply is noted. A similar cor-
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Thus the trends noted are (1) an unprecedentèdly high incre-
mental capital-intensity projected by the Fifth FYPincomparison
with earlier periods and (2) increasing average capital-intensity
over time. In one sense there is nothing inherently surprising, i.e.
demanding explanation, about such trends. Similar trends have
occurred elsewhere in growing economies. In the United States, for
example, average capital-intensity in the non-agricultural sector
of the economy was, with 1880 =100,180 in 1890, 143 in 1900, and
166 in 1912. In manufacturing, incremental capital-intensity was,
with 1899-1904 = 100, 105 in 1904-1909, 115 in 1909-1913,and186
in 19131920.b0
2. The Meaning of Capital-Intensity. Why measure capital-in-
tensity, incremental or average? What do such measures signify?
Average capital-intensity, as a measure of the stock of capital
available per worker, is certainly relevant to problems of economic
growth. If by economic growth we mean an increase in aggregate
and per capita output, probably the two most important determinants
of growth are technological advance and increased average capital-
intensity. Emphasis on average capital-intensity is further warranted
by the absence of aggregate measures of technological advance, and
by the reflection in increased average capital-intensity of significant
aspects of technological advance, i.e. the industrialization of pro-
ductive processes.
From the relevance of average capital-intensity, however, that
of incremental capital-intensity does not follow. Incremental and
average capital-intensities are not so related that inferences about
one can be drawn from observations of the other. Increasing mere-
respondence can be obtained for percentage increasesinnon-agricultural
capital or in non-agricultural productive capital and percentage increases in
energy supply. For the capital series see Norman M. Kaplan, "Capital Formation
and Allocation," in Soviet Economic Growth, Abram Bergson, editor, Row,
Peterson, 1953, Appendix Table v (Appendix distributed separately).
For non-agricultural capital in 1929 prices see Simon Kuznets, National
Product since 1869, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946, pp. 218 and
21.9. For the non-agricultural labor force see Historical Statistics of the United
States, 1789-1945, as cited, pp. 63 and 65. The increase in average capital-
intensity is understated by being unadjusted for the decrease in hours worked
per week (ibid., pp. 66-87).
The same data indicate the following changes in incremental capital-intensity,
with 1880-1890 —100:94 in 1890-1900, 111 in 1900-1912.
10SeePaul H. Douglas, The Theory of Wages, Macmillan, 1934, Tables 6,
8, and 9, pp. 121, 125, and 126. The same data indicate the following changes
in average capital-intensity, with 1899100: 119 in 1904, 143 in 1909, 154
in 1913, and 213 in 1920 (ibid., Table 12, p. 129),
207GROSSMAN
mental capital-intensity does not imply increasing average capital-
intensity; increasing average capital-intensity does not imply in-
creasing incremental capital-intensity.11 Therefore, inferences about
11LetK =capital;L =labor;ttime; K and k =thefirst and second
derivatives, respectively, of capital with respect to time; and L and L =the
first and second derivatives, respectively, of labor with respect to time. For
the present purposes K and L are each regarded as functions of time alone.
By definition, average capital-intensity is K/L and incremental capital-intensity
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average capital-intensity may be increasing with either increasing or decreasing
incremental capital-intensity, and incremental capital-intensity may be increas-
ing with either increasing or decreasing average capital-intensity.
There is, however, one set of circumstances in which an observation of
increasing incremental capital-intensity adds information about the change in
average capital-intensity. Suppose that for t =to,
KK
LL
208TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPITAL FORMATION
changes in the stock of capital per worker cannot be drawn from
observations of incremental capital-intensity. The justification for
measuring incremental capital-intensity must lie elsewhere.
Grossman relates increasing incremental and average capital-in-
tensity to the substitution of capital for labor in investment alterna-
tives. His problem is, Why are the non-agricultural capital-intensi-
ties (incremental and average) provided for by the Fifth FYP (1951-
1955) so unprecedentedly high? The problem is approached as an
allocation problem, i.e. What determines the distribution of capital
and labor between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors,
given the total output of each sector and the total capital and labor
force for the economy?12 Moreover, the only problem explicitly dis-
cussed is, Why is the rate of growth of the non-agricultural labor
force foreseen by the Fifth FYP so unprecedentedly low?
To pursue the conceptual framework employed by Grossman,
suppose we postulate a production function for the non-agricultural
sector of the economy in which output X is a function of labor L and
capital K, a function which is different for different points in time.
Suppose, further, we date the variables by using the subscripts 0, 1,
and 2 to represent the values of the variables at the successive points
in time 0, 1, and 2, respectively. Thus we have observable values of
output, labor, and capital for each of three points in time. In addi-
tion, for each' of the three outputs we have, at least conceptually,
an isoquant which represents alternative combinations of capita]
and labor yielding the given output. Chart 1 presents (1) the
isoquants for X =X0,X =X1,and X =X2;(2) three points A,
B, and C, the coordinates of which represent observed apita1 and
labor for X = Xo, X =X1,and X =X2;and (3) for expository
purposes, point D, an alternative (and unobserved) combination of
labor and capital on the isoquant for X =X2.If we connect the
points A, B, and C by straight lines, the slopes of the lines represent
observed incremental capital-int'ensities, e.g.
K1—K0
L1 —
andthat for tt0, K and L are positive. Then if K/L is a monotonically in-
creasing function of time for tto,K/Lis also a monotonically increasing
function of time for tto.
12 Fora closer examination of Grossman's conceptual framework see my
footnote 15.
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The ratios of each pair of coordinates of points A, B, and C represent
observed average capital-intensities, e.g. K0/L0. I have selected the
points so that incremental and average capital-intensities increase
with time.13
In a static sense the alternative implied by capital-labor substitu-
tion is a movement along an isoquant, e.g. a movement from point
C to point D. In a dynamic sense the alternative implied by capital-
labor substitution is a movement from one to another time path of
investment and additions to the labor force by which a later (and
higher) output is achieved, e.g. a movement from BC to BD. Is there
in either sense a relationship between capital-intensities, as time
series, and substitution between capital and labor?
In the static sense the marginal rate of substitution between
capital and labor is the slope of the isoquant (and is negative). Thus
conceptually associated with points A, B, and C are three such
marginal rates of substitution—the tangents to each of the isoquants
at points A, B, and C. What Grossman has measured, however, are
the (positive) slopes of AB and BC and the ratios of each pair of
13I.e.the slope of BC exceeds the slope of AB, point C is above the straight
line drawn through B from the origin, and point B is above the straight line
drawn through A from the origin.
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coordinates for points A, B, and C. It is clear that neither the mar-
ginal rate of substitution nor changes therein are measured by
incremental or average capital-intensities. Moreover, without per-
missive information about the production functions, one cannot
infer from increasing average capital-intensity that the marginal
rate of substitution is numerically larger at point C that at point
B; nor can one make the converse inference.14 Finally, it is clear
from Chart 1 that incremental capital-intensity per se is irrelevant
to this class of inferences.
In a dynamic sense the substitution of capital for labor can be
interpreted to mean that in the movement from one isoquant to a
later (and higher) one a time path is followed which has a larger
ratio of investment to the increment in the labor force than an
alternative time path, e.g. in Chart 1 that the slope of BC is greater
than that of BD. Within Grossman's conceptual framework, how-
ever, there is in one sense no alternative time path. If total' output
in each of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of the
economy is given, if total capital and labor for the economy are
given, and if the allocation of resources is (or is planned to be)
efficient in the sense that no reallocation of resources can increase
one of the outputs without decreasing the other, the distribution
of capital and labor between sectors is uniquely determined by the
given outputs and the given capital and labor tota1s.' To avoid this,
14Thereis a special case in which increasing average capital-intensity im-
plies increasing marginal rates of substitution at the observed points, and con-
versely—namely, a production function which isinvariant with time and
homogeneous of degree 1. This case, however, is certainly not applicable to
Soviet economic development.
15Grossman'sconceptual framework for the analysis of capital-intensity in the
Fifth FYI?, adopted to "facilitate treatment," is as follows (pp. 182-185): In each
of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors of the economy, output is given
by the plan and there is an isoquant which states the alternative (minimum)
combinations of capital and labor by which the given output can be produced.
Given also are total capital (the sum of beginning capital and net investment
during the plan) and tçtal labor. The problem is, What determines the
knowns, the distribution of capital and labor between the sectors? The system is
stated to have the property that choice of a point on one isoquant "uniquely
determines" the point on the other and also determines average and incremental
capital-intensity in each sector.
It seems to me that these simplifying assumptions have all but simplified
the problem out of existence. If the isoquants in each of the sectors have the
usual properties of negative slope and convexity to the origin,i.e.if the
marginal rate of substitution of capital for labor increases as the quantity of
capital increases relative to that of labor, there is no factor distribution problem
within the framework stated except in the special sense of a choice between
two inefficient allocations. Suppose we draw the usual Edgeworth diagram in
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which the two sectors of the economy are related through their common use
of capital and labor, from given totals, to produce agricultural output Y and




associated with the infinite number of outputs in each, only the pair for the
given outputs (YY0 and XX,) is presented. If the two isoquants touch
(but do not intersect) as in the diagram at point A, there is only one distribu-
tion of capital and labor consistent with the given outputs and the given total
capital and labor. That is to say, the distribution of capital and labor between
sectors is uniquely determined by the given outputs and the given total capital
and labor. If the isoquants intersect, there are two distributions of capital and
labor between the sectors which will produce exactly the outputs given with
full employment of total capital and labor. Both points of intersection, however,
represent inefficient allocations of resources in the sense that reallocations of
capital and labor between the sectors can increase one of the outputs without
decreasing the other. There are an infinite number of such possible reallocations,
represented by all points in the area bounded by the intersecting isoquants. For
any pair of given outputs in this area, however, there is only one distribution
of capital and labor consistent with the given total capital and labor. Thus
either (1) the problem is a choice between two, and only two, inefficient allo-
cations in the face of unambiguously preferable allocations; or (2) the as-
sumption of given outputs must be relaxed and the problem cannot be con-
ceived as a choice among points on a given isoquant; or (3) the assumption
of full employment of total Capital and labor must be relaxed, in which case
choice of a point on one isoquant does not determine the point on the other.
If within either the non-agricultural sectors or the agricultural sectors the
ratio of the marginal physical productivities of capital andlabor is not uniform
in all uses, the entire conceptual apparatus collapses becausethe allocation of
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let us treat the output of the agricultural sector as a residual and
consider the non-agricultural sectçr of the economy alone.
In Chart 1, then, there are an infinite number of alternative paths
from, say, X1 to X2: some will have slopes greater than the slope of
BCandothers like BDwillhave slopes less than BC.All,moreover,
are in the nature of the case unobserved. If it is held that, in the
dynamic sense, BCsubstitutescapital for labor, the alternative and
unobserved time path (say, BD)withwhich BCiscompared must
somehow be specified. Two possible specifications come to mind
from Grossman's paper: an optimal time path with a slope less than
that of the observed path,16 and an extrapolation of previous trends.
It is possible that BCsubstitutescapital for labor is an uneconomic
way, i.e. that there is an alternative path, BD,whichin some sense
is optimal. But the optimal time patfi, however defined, is not rele-
vant to observed trends in capital-intensities because the implica-
tion of an optimal, less capital-intensive time path is only that
incremental and average capital-intensities, whether increasing or
decreasing, are larger than they should be.
To infer from increasing incremental capital-intensity that capital
is being substituted for labor might also mean that, apart from the
choice among investment alternatives which yield identical out-
puts, incremental capital-intensity is (or should be) invariant with
time. That is to say, BC is held to substitute capital for labor
because its slope is greater than that of BD, derived from a con-
tinuation of AB. I see no reason, and Grossman advances none, to
expect a continuation of past trends. The variables omitted are
the increment in output'7 and technological change: the ratio of
investment to the increment in the labor force depends not only
on capital-labor substitutions but also on the increment of output,
in kind and quantity, and on the range of technologically possible
16Asa possible explanatory factor in the retardation of the rate of growth
of non-agricultural labor, Grossman mentions a technological bias on the part
of Soviet planners in favor of "the grandiose project and... themost advanced
technical design" in non-agricultural production, a bias which originates in
ideological affection for high labor productivity and uneconomic criteria for
investment choice (page 195).
It should also be noted that Grossman regards his discussion as one of
"optimum capital-intensity" (page 197).
17Ina concluding paragraph Grossman relaxes his assumption of given out-
put but only to point out the possibility "that the retardatiOn in the expansion
of non-agricultural employment, and the rising capital needs required to assist
the transfer of manpower and to replace labor, might explain the small but
perceptible retardation in the rate of growth of industrial output indicated
by the Fifth Five-Year Plan" (page 198).
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capital and labor coefficients associated with the increment of out-
put and feasible capital-labor substitutions. I see no reason to be-
lieve that the influence of output increments •and technological
change is(or should be) neutral with respect to capital-labor
ratios, incremental or average. Accordingly, I see no reason to infer
from increasing incremental capital-intensity, from the fact that
the slope of BC exceeds the slope of AB (or BD),thatcapital is
being substituted for labor.
Where does all this lead? My original question was, Why measure
incremental or average capital-intensity? By way of summary, I am
led to the following conclusions: (1) Though the stock of capital
available per worker is a relevant quantity from the viewpoint of
economic growth, no justification for the measurement of incre-
mental capital-intensity can b derived thereby. Incremental and
average capital-intensities, as defined, are not so related that an
increase in one implies an increase in the other. (2) In the structure
of Grossman's argument, increasing incremental and average capital-
intensities are related to the substitution of capital for labor in
investment alternatives. No connection between the quantities meas-
ured and the concept suggested is successfully established in the
paper, nor am I able to establish one. If a connection cannot be
established, Grossman's analysis of the retardation in the rate of
growth of the non-agricultural labor force—interesting enough in
itself—bears no systematic relationship to the observed trends in
capital formation. In my opinion his conceptual framework fails to
unify the empirical observations of increasing capital-intensities and
the explanatory analysis which follows.
S. The Non-agricultural Labor Force, Demand and Supply. Apart
from its implications with respect to Soviet capital formation, Gross-
man's analysis of recent trends in the non-agricultural labor force
commands attention on its own merits. The basic observation is that,
as foreseen in the Fifth FYP, the 1951-1955 percentage increase in
the non-agricultural labor force is to be unprecedentedly low.18
The problem is to explain the retardation in the rate of growth.
18Jshould be noted that this retardation is especially striking in com-
parison with previously realized increases (Grossman, Table 1). Both the Third
and the Fourth FYP (1988-1942 and 1946-1950) provided for rates of growth
which were not substantially larger than that in the Fifth FYP and for absolute
increases which were about the same as that in the Fifth FYP. Thus the average
annual rate of growth of the non-agricultural labor force was 3.5 per cent from
1987 to 1942 plan, 8.8 per cent from 1945 to 1950 plan, and 2.8 per cent from
1950 to 1955 plan; the absolute increments were about 5.0 million "workers
and employees" from 1987 to 1942 plan, about 6.8 million from 1945 to 1950
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Grossman states and explores a number of hypotheses as possible
explanations. They are classified into detentive factors, i.e. those
which tend to detain labor in uses other than non-agricultural em-
ployment, and deterrent factors, i.e. those which tend to deter labor
from use in non-agricultural employment. More conventionally, the
classification separates the factors which influence the supply of
non-agricultural labor from the factors which influence the demand
for it. It would be difficult to think of hypotheses which are im-
portant possibilities and which are excluded from consideration.
It is impossible to disqualify any considered.
Among the most interesting of the possible explanatory factors is
the cost of urbanization. The hypothesis is that the capital cost
of urbanization is sufficiently high to deter the transfer of labor
from agriculture and to promote the substitution of capital for labor
in non-agricultural sectors (Grossman, pages 188-193). The calculus
suggested is as follows: Given outputs in the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, there is a capital cost to the economy (i') in-
volved in the transfer of an additional worker from agriculture to
another sector. In somewhat simpiffied fonn,
i'=h(l+d) +t+a
where h = the capital cost of housing and other urban facilities
per person
d = the number of dependents per wage earner
t = the cost of training an agricultural worker in non-agri-
cultural work
a = the investment in agriculture necessary to replace the
transferred worker and maintain output.
Under the same assumptions there is an alternative capital cost to
the economy (i") which is the equipment expenditure in non-agri-
cultural sectors necessary to maintain output in lieu of the use of
plan, and about 5.7 million from 1950 to 1955 plan. The Third FYP was, of
course, interrupted by the war: the average annual rate of growth from 1937
to 1940 was 5.0 per cent, though this partly reflects the territorial additions
in 1939-1940. The increases foreseen by the Fourth FYPwerevastly over-
fullilled. Thus the query arises, WilltheFifth FYP increases in the non-agri-
cultuial labor force be significantly overfulfilled? The data available in Novem-
ber 1953, when this comment was written, suggested a negative answer (see
Pravda, January 29, 1952 and January 23, 1953, and Vestnik statistiki, 1953,
No. 4, p. 8). However, as Grossman's postscript indicates, recent data reveal
that in 1954 the number of "workers and employees" was already in excess of
that originally planned for 1955 (see Pravda, January 21, 1955).
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an additional worker. If i' <i", the worker will be transferred; if
i' > i", the worker will be retained in agriculture. Grossman
mentions some preliminary calculations which suggest that for some
branches of the non-agricultural economy, i' > i". Needless to say,
when these calculations appear they will be received with great
interest.
A few comments, however, are in order here.
1. Population growth in the U.S.S.R. implies expenditures on
housing, consumer facilities, and training whether or not there is
a transfer of labor from agriculture to the non-agricultural economy.
In the decision to transfer or not to transfer labor, only the difference
in such expenditure is relevant. Thus if i' and i" are calculated
literally as defined, i' will be overstated in relation to i" because
the capital cost of rural housing and other rural facilities has been
ignored in h and the cost of training agricultural labor has been
ignored in t.
2. If there is surplus labor in agriculture, as Grossman elsewhere
suggests (page 186), this may imply zero or negative marginal
productivity in agriculture and, therefore, a zero value for a.
3. The need to compensate agriculture with capital for its loss
of labor derives from the assumption that (planned) outputs in
agriculture and the non-agricultural sectors are given. Under less
restrictive assumptions, whether agriculture should be so compen-
sated depends upon the marginal productivities of capital in agri-
culture and other sectors, made commensurate by the planners' pref-
erence function. Though there is certainly an allocation problem
posed by possible capital-labor substitutions, it would be irrational
for Gosplan to think in terms of the calculus suggested, given the
output of both sectors. There is also a marginal rate of substitution
between agricultural output and non-agricultural output which can-
not be ignored.
4. It seems to me that Grossman overstates the failure of a
market economy, in comparison with an all-embracing planned
economy, to take into account the social costs of urbanization. There
may be many such social costs which do not enter the private
cost function of the entrepreneur. However, the costs of housing
and urban facilities would seem to enter the cost functions via the
wages found necessary to attract labor.
5. In connection with the data on capital-intensity, it should be
noted that a larger increase in the non-agricultural labor force might
increase observed incremental capital-intensity via the impact on
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observed investment of increased expenditures on housing and other
urban facilities. Unless the numerator of incremental capital-intensity
is restricted to certain kinds of investment, it is not clear to me that
a decrease in the incremental labor force means an increase in in-
vestment, even abstracting from the considerations previously men-
tioned.
With respect to the other hypotheses listed by Grossman I have
only a few scattered comments:
1. Grossman's remarks on the Soviet bias in favor of advanced
technology (pages 194-195) and on the Soviet interest in mechaniza-
tion and automation (pages 192-193) whet my appetite for more.
I would like to know how advanced Soviet technology is, how un-
even their advances are, what opportunities exist for further tech
nological imitation of advanced economies, what modifications they
have made in borrowed processes and products, what capital-labor
substitutions they make in detail, which inputs they economize rela-
tive to United States practices, etc. It seems to me that a compara-
tive study, combining engineering and economic talents, of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. technology, manufacturing processes, and product design
is long overdue.
2. Grossman expects a reduction in the proportion of females in
the non-agricultural labor force largely on the grounds of the con-
tinuous improvement in real wages and consumption standards
(page 187). An increase in real wages, however, has both an income
effect and a substitution effect on the choice between housekeeping
(leisure?) and gainful employment.19 Itis not clear, therefore,
whether an increase in real wages deters or encourages participation
of females in gainful employment.
3. Grossman notes a planned increase, from 1950 to 1955, of 5 to
7 million students in the last three grades of secondary school and of
possibly several hundred thousand in secondary technical schools
and in institutions of higher learning. Of course, not all these students
would be in the non-agricultural labor force were they not in school,
but many would be and those that would have been in the agri-
cultural labor force might have permitted additional transfers of
labor from agriculture to other sectors. If, in the absence of the
increased educational program, the planned 1955 non-agricultural
labor force would have been 4 million more than presently planned
for 1955, the absolute increase in the non-agricultural labor force
°SeeCershon Cooper, "Taxation and Incentive in Mobilization," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, February 1952, pp. 43 if.
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would have been almost 10 million from 1950 to 1955 plan as
against 11 million between 1945 and 1950 and the average annual
rate of increase would have been 4.7 per cent as against 5.4 per cent
between 1947 and 1951, 5.0 per cent between 1987 and 1940, and
3.5 per cent between 1937 and 1942 plan (Grossman, page 198).
Thus the increased educational program might well be the entire
explanation for the unprecedented lowness of the Fifth FYP rate of
increase. In any case, the increased educational program certainly
represents, in a real and important sense, a substitution of capital
for labor via investment-in-self.
4. Among the factors mentioned as possible explanations for the
retardation in the rate of growth of the non-agricultural labor force
is the ambitious nature of the Fifth FYP agricultural output goals.
The suggestion of an increased concern on the part of Soviet au-
thorities for future agricultural development is of particular interest
because of its rather dramatic verification in recent events.20
Achievements recorded by the end of. 1952 must have made it
clear to Soviet authorities that, without extraordinary measures, the
announced goals for 1955 plan agriculture and consumers' goods
were unattainable. In an August 1953 speech Malenkov sounded
a new note of urgent concern for the Soviet consumer. The new-
ness of the note consisted in: (1) repetition of. a two- to three-year
time horizon within which a sharp rise in consumers' goods output
is to be effected, (2) admission that the current level of consumers'
goods output is unsatisfactory and the diagnosis that this is due
to past emphasis on heavy industry and transport in capital fonna-
tion, and (3) admission that agricultural output has lagged seri-
ously and that it is necessary "first of all" to develop agriculture if
consumption increases are to be attained. Though various measures
were more or less vaguely described, even less than usual was to be
learned about resource allocation from the 1953 Soviet budget, pre-
sented in August 1953, because of unusually large unexplained
residuals on both the revenue and expenditure sides. Consequently,
in the absence of further revelations of intentions, reservations about
possible shifts in the pattern of Soviet economic development seemed
prudent.
The new note continued in the Soviet press during August and
20 These remarks were written in November 1953 and are based on Pravda
issues from August through October. The decrees referred to on agriculture,
retail trade, and consumers' goods are in Pravda, September 26, September 29,
October 1, October 23, October 28, and October 30, 1953.
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September 1953. Finally, there appeared a series of speeches, re-
ports, and decrees which add up to quite impressive plans for
large and short-run consumption increases and agricultural un-
provements. There is not space to discuss these developments in
detail. Suffice it to note here that: (1) despite failures in 1951
and 1952, many of the ambitious goals set by the Fifth FYP for 1955
plan agriculture and consumption are now to be achieved in 1954;
(2) investment in agriculture, trade, and consumers' goods indus-
tries is to be increased markedly: (3) little is now being said about
the "Great Stalin construction projects" and nothing about the most
ambitious of them (e.g. the Turkmenian project); (4) there is little
indication of a problem with respect to the agricultural labor force
except in the case of specialists, of whom 100,000 are to be sent
to machine and tractor stations from ministries and local authorities
in 1954 plan; (5) there are suggestions of the use of international
trade to provide consumers' goods imports in exchange for pro-
ducers' goods exports.
So far, of course, these are just plans. But if fulfilled, the plans
will mean rapid increases in living standards. If not fulfilled by
significant margins, I feel from the way in which the changes have
been stated that serious internal problems may ensue. Future de-
velopments in these sectors must be watched with care.
AjxNDrn Enucn,RussianResearch Center, Harvard University;
and National Bureau of Economic Research
Grossman has marshaled impressive evidence in support of his
thesis. The increase in capital-labor ratios in Soviet industry as
shown by his figures is striking indeed; and while I have no quarrel
with his interpretation of this trend, I would like to contribute a
very tentative additional suggestion. It seems not unreasonable to
surmise that the Soviet economy may now be experiencing a de-
layed "replacement echo" of the great investment boom which be-
gan in the late 1920's and continued unabatedly until the German
invasion of 1941. There can be no doubt that a good deal of equip-
ment built in the period of the First and Second FYP's is now ready
for retirement. True, in earlier years the presence of large blocks of
worn-out and antiquated equipment would by no means have justi-
fied the conclusion that this equipment would actually be scrapped:
the Soviet writings of the 1930's and 1940's bear eloquent testimony
to the fact that the Soviet economic administration consistently
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adhered to the policy of working the old equipment to death. In view
of the very substantial expansion of the Soviet capital-making
capacity in the postwar period, however, a guess could be ventured
that the Soviet economy could now afford to retire the still service-
able old plant and replace it with the new, rather than to let the
latter come, as it were, on the top of the first.
Should such a change in policy have actually taken place (and this
is for the time being, to repeat, merely a not implausible hypothesis),
the increase in the net investment per industrial worker would be,
inall, probability, considerably smaller than Grossman's figures
would indicate. It should be noted, however, that his two indicators
of the capital-labor ratio would not be affected by this to the same
degree. Since the cement series reflects the behavior of total con-
structional activity over time, the increase of the share of replace-
ment in the gross investment should correspondingly reduce the
net portion of this series for the relevant years. The situation is
different with regard to the power consumption series, which meas-
ures increments and not totals: the figures it contains should be
taken to represent net magnitudes even under assumption of a
change in replacement policy, since the part of the newly installed
plant which represents the replacement of the retired units would
now be consuming the power supply set free after the scrapping
of the old plant. The figures in the relevant part of line 10 in Gross-
man's Table 2 would still tend to overstate the incremental capital
labor ratio tQ the extent to which the increased power consump-
tion per worker would be paralleled by a less-than-proportional
increase (or by an actual decline) in the use of non-electrical
energy per worker. But this qualification raises no new points because
the possibility of such upward bias was explicitly recognized by
Grossman.
ABRAMBERGSON,Columbia University
In his illuminating essay Grossman describes and explains recent
trends in the allocation of labor and capital between the agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors of the Soviet economy. This is a topic
that might be examined from more than one standpoint, but interest
here revolves chiefly around the recurring problem of the efficiency
of resource allocation. In the present context what is in question
particularly is the extent to which the Russians tend to realize their
"production possibilities" in the allocation of labor and capital be-
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tween the agricultural and non-agriciltura1 sectors. In studying
the trends in this allocation, one is interested in variations in this
tendency over time. The realization of production possibilities, it
will be recalled, is a desideratum that is entirely independent of
the Soviet authorities' preferences regarding the bill of goods. If
production possibilities are not attained, a suitable reallocation af-
fords an opportunity to increase the output of either agricultural or
non-agricultural goods, or, if it is so desired, both of these products.
While it has seemed desirable to state this problem somewhat more
explicitly than Grossman does, I must leave to the reader a review,
in the light of my remarks, of the interesting facts and arguments he
sets forth. I will comment here on only one or two aspects of the
problem.
Grossman cites a number of factors which may tend to limit Soviet
transfers of labor from agriculture to industry. One is the "techno-
logical bias" of the Soviet planners which leads them to seek con-
tinually to raise the productivity of labor in industry. A review of
Soviet writings would undoubtedly yield a good deal of support for
the view that such a bias actually operates in the U.S.S.R. Moreover,
it is a familiar notion that in a country such as Russia, where a
vast population has been and still is engaged in agriculture, the bias
might lead to economic waste. The precise sense in which a waste
results, however, is not always made clear, so it may deserve under-
lining that the diseconomy takes the form of a failure to realize the
theoretic desideratum, the community's production possibilities.
Thus if the Russians are to achieve this goal, sizable transfers of
labor from agriculture to industry may have to be carried out year
after year. These transfers would proceed simultaneously with an
allocation of investments which would both assure the release of
workers from agriculture and equip them, for work in industry.
Insofar as a country attains its production possibilities, the total
output of both industrial and agricultural products is greater than
it would be otherwise. But with the indicated allocation of labor
and capital the productivity of labor in industry may nevertheless
rise only slowly. If an allocation, in accord with production pos-
sibilities were. instituted in circumstances where previously it had
not been realized, it might even lead to a drop in labor produc-
tivity. This is to say that with a bias in favor of labor productivity
such as that in the U.S.S.R., an efficient allocation might never be
realized at all. Moreover, the barrier to its full-scale introduction
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would grow ever greater, the higher the level of industrial produc-
tivity actually attained.
While Russia has a vast agricultural population, the question in-
volved here is the extent to which it is economically surplus, in the
sense that labor may be released from the agricultural sector at
the price of relatively limited investments or loss in output. Gross-
man comments only briefly on this question. For reasons which I have
set forth elsewhere,1 my own inclination is to think of larger pos-
sibilities of further labor economies than he does.
Grossman points out that the transfer of labor from agriculture
to industry may be limited also by superior urban living standards.
Given this superiority, the transfers are costly in terms of con-
sumers' goods. I have no question to raise on this score, but account
should be taken also of the further problem of transferring food
from the country to the city; The transfer of workers does not lead
automatically to a release of the agricultural produce needed to
support the migrants; somehow the government must extract the
produce from the peasantry. This problem of the "marketed share"
of agricultural produce has long been central in the government's
relations with agriculture. While the government's control of agricul-
ture through the collective farm system has enabled it to raise the
marketed share far above the low levels attained under peasant
agriculture in the late 1920's, the government must hesitate to
increase still further such exactions. This would be an additional
factor tending to limit transfers of labor. Moreover, as will readily
be seen, this would also tend to cause further deviations from
production possibilities.
In his discussion of recent trends in the allocation of labor and
capital, Grossman focuses attention especially on the low rate of
growth (2.8 per cent per year) projected for the non-agricultural
labor force under the Fifth FYP (1951-1955). He views this as
marking a new phase in Soviet planning. On the face of it this de-
velopment also emphasizes the question of the degree to which
Soviet resource allocation realizes production possibilities. But I do
not wish to pursue this aspect further here. Rather, my concern is
a limited factual one. In my opinion Crossman is undoubtedly right
in thinking that the low rate of growth projected in the current
plan sets a precedent, but in appraising its extent I would like to
emphasize a few matters which he may not have stressed sufficiently.
1Seemy discussion in Soviet Economic Growth, Abram Bergson, editor,
Row, Peterson, 1953, pp. 308-310.
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While I agree with Grossman in assuming that the Fifth FYP
still warrants careful study despite the important economic events
since Stalin's death, a question is in order concerning the "realism"
of the Plan at the time of its promulgation. One inevitably wonders
in particular how seriously to take the feature which occupies a
central place in the discussion: the rate of growth projected for the
non-agricultural labor force. Some interest may attach, then, to
the following tabulation of the Russians' record of fulfillment of the









2nd FYP goal, 1937 28.9
Actual, 1987 27.0
3rd FYP goal, 1942 320
Actual, 1940 81.2
Actual, 1945 27.3
4th FYP goal, 1950 33.5
Actual, 1950 38.2
5th FYP goal, 1955 43.9
Actual, 1951 39.8
Actual, 1952 40.7
a Strictly speaking, these Soviet official data refer to all hired labor, including
not only non-agricultural but also several million agricultural wage earners.
Evidently, the four previous Plans were unevenly fulfilled. Since
the First and Fourth Plans were greatly overfulifiled, One is im-
pelled to question the "realism" of the goal of the current Plan. How-
ever, it will be noted too that during the first two years of the
present Plan, 1951-1952, the Russians managed to keep more or
less within the framework of their current long-term goal; very
possibly the present plan will turn out to be operational after all.
2Onthe scope of the figures see Grossman's essay, notes to Table 1. The
figures on actual employment are from Trud v S.S.S.R., Moscow, TsUNKhU, 1986,
pp. 10 if.; Warren W. Eason, "Population and Labor Force," in Soviet Eco-
nomic Growth, as cited, p. 110; and Grossman's essay, Table 1. The Plan
goals are from Grossman's essay;Piatiletnii plan narodno-khozieistvennogo
stroitel'stva S.S.S.R., Tom i,Moscow,Gosplan S.S.S.R., 1929, p.127; and
State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., The Second Five Year Plan for the
Development of the National Economy of the USSR (1933-1937), London,
Lawrence, p. 545.
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In considering to what extent the present Plan represents a break
with past experience, two other matters must be examined. First,
as Grossman explains, the rate of growth projected under the Fifth
FYP (2.8 per cent per year) is actually only a little lower than
the one that was projected under the Third (3.5 per cent per year).
The rate actually realized under the latter Plan prior to the German
attack, i.e. in the period 1937-1940, was 5.0 per cent, but the 1940
employment figure on which this growth rate is based reflects the
expansion in Soviet territory during 1939-1940. However, it does
not take into account an increase in working hours from an average
of about forty-one to forty-eight per calendar week in June 1940.
Second, the actual rate of growth under the Second FYP was but
3.3 per cent. Grossman apparently feels that for his purposes the
Second FYP ought to be lumped with the First. This is on the plausi-
ble ground that many of the workers recruited under the First FYP
were not really assimilated until the following quinquennium. It
should be observed, however, that the current Plan may in some
measure be similiarly related to its predecessor, which •witnessed a
major expansion in the labor force not only during but after de-
mobilization.
REPLY BY THE AUTHOR
My appreciation to the three commentators for lighting their
lamps in the dark alley into which I have lured them! I find myself
in sympathy with all of Bergson's and Erliçh's remarks, and so, after
a nod in their direction, I turn to Kaplan's comments. Kaplan has
paid me the high compliment of studying my paper carefully, and
preparing a most patient and. valuable critique of it. I am in accord
with him on some of his points; with regard to some others our dif-
ferences are slight. My rejoinder is therefore addressed only to the
major issues between us.
Do my indicators—cement consumption and the increment in
electric power output—indicate anything? Kaplan has constructed
his Table 1 to show the relationship between annual movements in
investment (at stable prices) and in these two series1 during selected
periods in Soviet experience. The investment series are from Soviet
sources and their exact derivation is not always clear, but they may
be provisionally accepted in the absence of more reliable data. The
The fact that he uses cement output while I refer to cement consumption
where possible should not make much difference.
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three series show far from identical annual changes, the correspond-
ence between investment and increment in power being poorer than
that between investment and cement output. Better correspondence
would probably be found if blocks of years (as in my Table 2) rather
than individual years were the basis of comparison; but the nature
of the data prevents this.
Kaplan is probably right that "as indicators in a more accurate
sense" my two series "seem to fail." But I was not so hopeful as to
demand this of them. My purpose has not been to draw exact
inferences with regard to the relative volume of investment during
the various periods, but rather to sketch the major outline of the
rise in incremental capital-intensity in the non-agricultural sector
of the Soviet economy. I regarded the two series as a "very rough
and tentative indication," and Kaplan's Table 1 seems to support
me in this view, for it does show that on the whole the order of
magnitude of the volume of investment is preserved in one or both
of the other series. In Kaplan's own words (italics his), "The
hypothesized relationships may be adequate to yield what Grossman
requires—namely, an indication of increasing incremental capital-
intensity..
Kaplan'ssection on "The Meaning of Capital-Intensity" is most
stimulating. He is quite right, of course, about the mathematics.
Increasing incremental capital-intensity does not imply increasing
average capital-intensity. If in the paper I appear to assume so, it
is only because the suggested magnitudes are such that the incre-
mental capital-intensity in the U.S.S.R. during the Fifth FYP must
almost certainly have exceeded the average capital-intensity, and
therefore the latter must have been rising as well. The contrary
possibility is hardly worth attention in this instance. Further, he is
correct in that the marginal rate of substitution between capital and
labor is not measured by the incremental or average capital-intensi-
ties. (Nor have I tried to use them in this way.) Now he asks: (1)
Since the stock of capital per worker, i.e. the average ratio, is the
relevant quantity from the viewpoint of economic growth, why intro-
duce the incremental concept? and (2) What is the relation between
a rising incremental capital-intensity and a notion of substitution of
capital for labor (which can be read into my approach)?
1. I would answer that the incremental ratio is relevant to the
process of economic growth, and hence to planning for it, quite
apart from its impact on the average. The characteristic features of
an economy derive not only from the capital-labor ratio at some
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point in time, but also from the slope of the path traversed to get
there, i.e. from the incremental ratio. This indeed is implicit in much
of the contemporary discussion of the "advantages" of economic
backwardness. Average capital-intensity is an inadequate tool for a
dynamic analysis of the process of growth, in part because of such
well-known phenomena as the limited economic mobility of capital
after it has been embodied in capital goods and the poor reversibility
of certain socio-economic processes such as urbanization.
Perhaps an appeal to extreme cases will help to emphasize my
point. Surely the process of growth is different if capital is the only
factor whose supply increases signfficantly while the supply of other
factors remains constant (incremental capital-intensity equals in-
finity), or if it is labor which alone increases (incremental capital-
intensity equals zero). Numerous important variables are affected
thereby, such as the technology of new investment projects, extent
of obsolescence and replacement of existing capital equipment, trans-
fer of labor within the economy to achieve its better combination
with capital, urbanization, and so forth. (Given the target isoquarit,
the marginal rate of substitution is affected thereby, though we can-
not a priori tell more than the direction of the difference.) This range
of problems overlaps those discussed in my paper in connection with
labor allocation, thus showing the presence, if not of a "systematic
relationship" between the two parts of my paper (which Kaplan
fails to find), at least of a logical nexus between them.
It has been pointed out2 with good reason that by comparison with
average capital-intensity, incremental capital-intensity will fluctuate
violently and so give an exaggerated picture of policy changes.
This difficulty can be avoided in part by comparing groups of years
instead of individual years, as is done in the paper. But in this
instance we may be particularly fortunate in that erratic fluctua-
tions in the incremental ratio are presumably kept down, thanks to
full employment of labor and capacity in the non-agricultural sector
in all periods, consistently high rates of investment out of national
product, and constant pressure to expand output.
2. Inquiring into the existence of a logical connection between
incremental capital-intensity and the notion of substitution of capital
for labor, Kaplan fails to find it established in my paper, nor can he
establish one for a dynamic context. His critique is illuminating, but
his search is unnecessary. Insofar as a notion of substitution underlies
2E.g.by Moses Abramovitz in a private communication to the author.
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my discussion, it is substitution along the target isoquant, i.e. in a
static and not in a dynamic sense. (Substitution of capital for labor
does have an unambiguous meaning in the former sense,, as Kaplan
agrees.) Incremental capital-intensities enter only as alternative
paths traversed to reach the target isoquant. The substitution in
question is therefore not a dynamic concept, but a description of
the difference between points on the same isoquant.
Perhaps if the phrase is to have a useful connotation in a dynamic
picture at all,it should be defined operationally: we can call it
a significant replacement of labor by capital in exirting enterprises
so as to release all or part of, the manpower required to operate
the newly created production facilities. The reshuffle of labor would
presumably be based on efficiency considerations, i.e. on a com-
parison of the marginal rates of substitution between capital and
labor in the old and in the protected production facilities. It is
clear that incremental capital-intensity would have to be above a
certain value in order for this, and not the reverse, movement of
labor to take place; and the higher the incremental ratio, the more
labor has to be so transferred (given the target isoquant of the
sector within which the reshuffling takes place). A large reshuffle
of this sort is an important aspect of the economy's growth process—
hence perhaps a justification of the use of the incremental concept.
As mentioned in the paper, the Soviet economy seems now to be
experiencing such labor transfer within the non-agricultural sector.
Kaplan correctly points out3 that under my "simplifying assump-
tion" of the whole economy's being represented by two isoquants,
and fixed supplies qf two factors, the choice of a position on one of
them does not uniquely determine the position on the other, as I
stated, except at the optimum for the whole system.
The last section of Kaplan's comments deals with numerous points
in relation to my detentive and deterrent factors. I reply selectively.
I omitted the cost of training agricultural labor and of providing
rural housing from the definition of i' because these, under Soviet
conditions, are typically not costs to the state, and it is the state's
computations that we are trying to reconstruct. I would not expect
Soviet planners to be especially concerned with them in choosing
between investment alternatives.
Kaplan's case "that a larger increase in the non-agricultural labor
force might increase observed incremental capital-intensity via the
His footnote 15.
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impact on observed investment of increased expenditures on hous-
ing and other urban facilities," assuming (I take it) an invariant non-
agricultural output, is not a possibility that would be knowingly and
rationally chosen by the planners. It requires more of each factor
of production to achieve the same output. It is, of course, just with
reference to Soviet attempts to get away from this inefficiency that
I try texplain the small planned increase in non-agricultural em-
ployment during the Fifth FYP.
I expect a reduction in the proportion of women in the non-
agricultural labor force as a result of a future rise in real wages.
Kaplan points out, correctly, that "An increase in real wages
has both an income effect and a substitution effect on the choice
between housekeeping (leisure?) and gainful employment." He
concludes, "It is not clear, therefore, whether an increase in real
wages deters or encourages participation of females' in gainful em-
ployment." Prediction in this case is no less hazardous than in so
many others, but perhaps past experience tips the scales in favor of
the attitude taken in my paper. I refer to the increase in the propor-
tion of women in the non-agricultural labor force coincident with
the decline in real wages after 1928, and the small reduction in this
proportion since 1947. True, the proportion continued to rise even
in the late 1930's, i.e. after real wages had substantially recovered
from their lows in the first half of the decade. But it must be re
membered that these years also witnessed a sharply accelerated
withdrawal of males from the non-agricultural labor force into
military service and forced labor camps.
I should like to conclude by reiterating Kaplan's plea for a
thorough and competent study of the various facets of Soviet tech-
nology. The results should be most relevant to an understanding
of past Soviet development, the potential for growth in the near
future which the economy contains, and the dynamics of the growth
process itself.
Cf. Warren W. Eason, "Population and Labor Force," in Soviet Economic
Growth, Abram Bergson, editor, Row, Peterson, 1953.
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